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Thesis
THE THEORY OF PERSONALITY IN THE
PHILOSOPHIES OF BOSANQUET AND SORLEY
by
Earl Edward Barrett
(A.B., Asbury, 1920)
(S.T.D., Gordon, 1930)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

1932

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THE THEORY OF PERSONALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF BOSANQUET AND SORLEY

INTRODUCTION

A. The subject.

The subject of this thesis is the theory of personality in the philosophies of Bosanquet and Sorley.

B. The problem.

The problem is to discover, if possible, which of these philosophers has presented the more reasonable, adequate and satisfactory account of personality. This will involve, of course, comparison and contrast of their views upon this subject.

C. The philosophical position of each writer.

Bernard Bosanquet was¹ an idealist. There is a strain in his thought that can be traced back to Plato. This may be due, in part at least, to the fact that Benjamin Jowett was one of his teachers at Oxford.² Bosanquet was an idealist of the Hegelian school. Scott regards F.H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, and W.T. Harris as the most representative of the modern Neo-Hegelians.³ He was also influenced by Lotze.

¹ He died Feb. 8, 1923.

² Bosanquet, Helen, BSAL, 24.

³ Scott, J.W., "Neo-Hegelianism", ERE, IX, 300.

THE THEORY OF PERSONALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL AND SCHLEGEL

INTRODUCTION

A. The subject.

The subject of this thesis is the theory of personality in the philosophy of Hegel and Schlegel.

B. The problem.

The problem is to discover, if possible, which of these philosophers has presented the more reasonable, adequate and satisfactory account of personality. This will involve, of course, comparison and contrast of their views upon this subject.

C. The philosophical position of each.

Other.

Hegel's philosophy was an idealist. There

is a certain in his thought that can be traced back to Plato.

This may be seen in part at least, in the fact that Hegel's

thought was one of his teachers at Oxford.¹ Schlegel was

an idealist of the Hegelian school. Hegel regarded F.H.

Schlegel, E. Hegel, and F.T. Hegel as the most representa-

tative of the school Hegel-Hegelianism.² He was also influenced

by Kant.

¹ He first met F.H. Hegel in 1818.
² Schlegel, Hegel, and F.T. Hegel.
³ Schlegel, J.H., "Hegelianism", *Enc. Brit.*, 1890.

Leighton considered Bosanquet as the greatest of the English idealists, the objective idealist or speculative philosopher who stands nearest to Hegel. He notes the close resemblance between "the movement from Kant to Hegel, and the English movement from Green to Bradley and Bosanquet".¹ Certainly Hegel's doctrines of the Absolute and Negativity reappear in the philosophy of Bosanquet.

The influence of the neo-Hegelian, Bradley upon Bosanquet is very marked. Bradley had defined metaphysics as an attempt to know reality; he had made the usual idealistic distinction between appearance and reality, and had declared for a view of the universe as a whole. Conceiving reality as a unit and as an experience, he had pointed out the difficulty that would face any idealist who made the self ultimate; he had maintained that every thinker who looked upon the universe as a whole must do something with the problem of evil, and although respectful towards religion, he had expressed his skepticism concerning the existence of a personal God.² These distinctions and suggestions Bosanquet accepted. There were slight differences in their point of view.³ For Bosanquet, the essence of philosophy was, "the connected vision of the totality of things" in which every element is subordinated to, and conditioned by, the totality.⁴

1. Leighton, J.A., "An Estimate of Bosanquets Philosophy", *Phil. Rev.*, 32, 625.

2. Bradley, AP, 1, 75, 144, 197, 204, 453.

3. Cuming, Agnes, "Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet", *Mind*, 26, 162.

4. Bosanquet, SP, 25-26.

Then, Bosanquet was an idealist of the impersonal type. His "Absolute" is not personal, as will be seen. Thus, he stands over against what might be called the Lotzean group of idealists, composed of Lotze, F. H. Green, Renouvier, Eucken, Ward, Bowne, Rashdall, Pringle-Pattison, Sorley, and others. His position is similar to that of Spaulding although the latter holds reality to be "more than a person".¹

William Ritchie Sorley, on the other hand, is a pluralist of the Berkeleian and Lotzean school, that is, a personalist and theist. In his chief work so far as the interests of this thesis are concerned, his declared purpose is to discover what bearing ethical ideas have upon the conception of reality as a whole.² Ethical ideas must be given a place, if not the first place, in an examination of reality.³ As will be seen, he gives a high place to the individual; selves are real.⁴ His theism, also is much in evidence. He says that his argument begins with a discussion of values and ends with the idea of God.⁵

D. The method of each writer.

Bosanquet, employing the characteristic idealistic method--the synoptic-, appeals in a scientific and empirical manner to life, to experience.⁶

1. Brightman, PI, 171.
2. Spaulding, NR, 517.
3. Sorley, MVIG, 1.
4. Ibid. 4-5.

5. Thesis 31,32.
6. Sorley, MVIG, 1.
7. Bosanquet, PlV, XV11; SSE, 52
MECP, 3.

Then, Rosenbaum was an idealist of the

impractical type. His "Abolition" is not practical, as will

be seen. Thus, he speaks over spiritual what might be

called the rotten group of idealists, composed of poets,

Y. H. Green, Kennedys, Hooker, Ward, Brown, Hawthorne,

Wright-Patterson, Solovy, and others. His position is

similar to that of spending although the latter holds

realism to be "more than a garden".

William Wright-Patterson, on the other hand, is

a disciple of the Hawthorne and Kennedys school, that is,

a practicalist and realist. In his chief work on the

importance of this thesis and conclusion, his declared purpose

is to discover what existing ethical ideas have upon the con-

ception of reality as a whole. Ethical ideas must be given

a place, it is the first place, in an examination of reality.

As will be seen, he gives a high place to the individual.

He gives the real. His thesis, also is much in evidence. He

says that his argument begins with a discussion of what

and ends with the idea of God.

D. The method of each writer.

Rosenbaum, analyzing the characteristics

idealistic method--the typical--appeals in a scientific

and practical manner to facts, to experience.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Introduction, pp. 1-17. | 2. Thesis 21, 22. |
| 2. Development, pp. 17-31. | 3. Solovy, pp. 1-17. |
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In spite of this emphasis upon experience, Bosanquet was rationalistic in his treatment of philosophy, for he worked upon the basis, at least the most of his life, that logic, the spirit of totality, is the clue to reality, value, and freedom¹ This principle, otherwise called the principle of individuality, he considered, "the immanent criterion of the real"² Later, he saw his mistake. He was led to recognize that the central problem of philosophy is not merely knowledge but rather value--with its aspects of knowledge, aesthetic appreciation and goodness⁴

Sorley was also scientific in his method. Following Aristotle, he viewed the moral judgment as a perceptive judgment; goodness, for instance, is to be looked for in the concrete situation⁵ He made it clear that his method neither implies nor justifies the approach of subjective idealism to the objective. Constantly, he holds science in the background, comparing and contrasting it with ethics. Sorley deals with the concrete rather than merely with the abstract; he goes from the particular to the general⁶; he demands coherence, comprehensiveness, and classification in ethical systems⁷, and is consistent in the demand; and he uses the synoptic method. He grants that this view of reality needs the imagination in its formation, but denies that it is not logical and scientific, for science involves the same exercise of the imagination as conceptions

1. Bosanquet, PlV, XVlll; EL, 4.

2. PlV, 29;

3. PlV, XVlllland23; SP, 19-20.

4. Mackenzie, J.S. in critical notice of SP, Mind, 36, 484.

See also Title page of SP.

5. Sorley, MVIG, 91;

6. Ibid. 89-91;

7. Ibid. 96, 99, 100, 102.

In spite of this emphasis upon appearance,
Hornbush was realistic in his treatment of philosophy,
for he worked upon the basis, at least the most of
his life, that logic, the logic of reality, is the only
to reality, value, and freedom. This principle, otherwise
called the principle of individuality, he considered, "the
fundamental criterion of the real." Later, he saw his mistake.
He was led to recognize that the central problem of philosophy
is not merely knowledge but rather value--with its aspect
of knowledge, aesthetic appreciation and goodness.
Reality was also scientific in his method.
Following Aristotle, he viewed the moral judgment as a
perceptive judgment; goodness, for instance, is to be
looked for in our concrete situation. He made it clear
that his method neither implies nor justifies the approach
of subjective idealism to the objective. Consequently, he
holds science in the foreground, separating and contrasting
it with science. Moral deals with the concrete rather than
merely with the abstract; he goes from the particular to the
general; he demands coherence, comprehensiveness, and
classification in ethical systems; and he demands in the
demand; and he uses the synthetic method. He stresses that this
view of reality needs the imagination in its formation, but
demands that it is not logical and scientific, for science
involves the same exercise of the imagination as cooperation

1. Hornbush, E.W. XVII, 21, 22. Center, 1913, 21;
2. E.W. 1913;
3. E.W. XVII, 21-22.
4. Hornbush, E.W. in critical notice
of E.W. 1913, 401.
See also Table page of E.W.

differ from facts perceived. Atoms, electrical units and energy in thought are the products of the imagination.

Neither in science nor in philosophy is the work of imagination, a mere flight of fancy. It arises out of insight into experience.

Yet, while this is true, Sorley transcends the usual scientific approach. The laws, the purposes, and the propositions that determine value are not the same in the fields of ethics and the natural sciences; in the latter, the interest is in the universal, while in the former, the eyes are upon the individual, "the home of value". Sorley deals with complete experience, which he believes is not the subject-matter of those who restrict themselves to the physical and natural sciences.²

E. Standard abbreviations.

The standard abbreviations used in this thesis together with their explanations will be found in the bibliography at the end. Unless otherwise stated, the word "Thesis" refers to this thesis.

-
1. Sorley MVIG, 295.
 2. Ibid. III, 85, 507.
 3. Ibid. 21-22.

After from these persons, Adams, electrical noise and
energy in thought and the progress of the investigation.

Neither is science nor is philosophy the work of imagination, but the work of logic. It takes out of thought into experience.

Yes, while this is true, history transcends
the natural scientific approach. The laws, the purposes, and
the propositions that determine values are not the same in
the fields of ethics and the natural sciences; in the latter,
the interest is in the universal, while in the former, the
eyes are upon the individual, "the house of value". History
deals with complete experience, which the scientist is not the
subject-matter of those who restrict themselves to the
physical and natural sciences.

E. Standard abbreviations.

The standard abbreviations used in this
thesis together with their translations will be found in
the bibliography at the end. Unless otherwise stated, the
word "thesis" refers to this thesis.

1. Society, 1911, 1912.
2. Ibid. III, 1913.
3. Ibid. 1913-14.

CHAPTER ONE
THE NATURE OF PERSONAL LIFE

I. The character of true Individuality.

The character of true individuality as held by each of our writers may be seen in a consideration of the subject upon the basis of the division of the nature of man.

A. An intellectual being.

In the first place, man is an intellectual being. While the emphasis of neither Bosanquet nor Sorley is upon this aspect of finite nature, it is recognized by both. Mind, according to Bosanquet, is primarily consciousness, and it is not a mere container.¹

Sorley had a somewhat similar view. According to him, the "Being" of Hegel would not need to hold the germ of all its later developments; the intellect simply endeavors to understand an object, to get at reality.² Both intellectual and ethical concepts are derived from experience. Sorley's interest in the matter is in preparing the way for a type of ethics based on experience, as a substitute for the metaphysical type.³

¹ Bosanquet, TNM, 45.

² Sorley, MVIG, 19.

³ Ibid. 20-21.

CHAPTER ONE
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

1. THE CHARACTER OF TRUE INDIVIDUALITY

The character of true individuality is held by each of our writers to be seen in a consideration of the subject upon the basis of the division of the nature of man.

A. An Intellectual Being

In the first place, man is an intellectual being. While the suggestion of certain knowledge may carry in upon this aspect of finite nature, it is recognized by both mind, according to Descartes, is primarily rational-ness, and is in fact a mere conclusion.

Barley had a somewhat different view.

According to him, the "being" of Hegel's mind is not to hold the form of all the later development; the intellect is only necessary to understand an object, so that it is not itself an object. Both intellectual and ethical concepts are derived from experience. Barley's interest in the matter is in showing the way for a type of ethics based on experience, as a substitute for the conventional type.

1. Descartes, *Disc.*, 42.
2. Barley, *ibid.*, 19.
3. *ibid.*, 20-21.

B. A social being.

Secondly, man is a social being; upon this both writers agree.

1. Sorley's conception.

Though believing strongly in the distinctness of persons, Sorley accepted the findings of comparative psychology, declaring that the individual can not be understood apart from his relations to society by birth, education and business.¹ This will be sufficient upon the social nature of man, as his emphasis is elsewhere.

2. Bosanquet's view.

a) The distinctness of persons.

Bosanquet likewise believed in the distinctness of individuals.

Individuality, then, is positive. It means that what is individual, so far as it is so, is itself, not merely that it is not somebody else.²

He viewed the individual as a world in itself.³ He saw the impossibility of one finite center of experience "possessing as its own immediate experience the immediate experience of another"⁴

¹Sorley, EN, 156.

²Bosanquet, PlV, XX.

³Ibid; & Vd1, 320.

⁴Ibid. & Vd1, 47.

2. A social being.

Essentially, man is a social being; upon this

both writers agree.

1. Corley's conception.

Though believing strongly in the distinct-

ness of persons, Corley accepted the findings of psycho-

active psychology, believing that the individual can not be

understood apart from his relations to society by birth,

education and environment. This will be sufficient upon the

social nature of man, as his emphasis is elsewhere.

2. Rosenzweig's view.

a) The distinctness of persons.

Rosenzweig likewise believed in the dis-

tinctness of individuals.

Individuality, then, is positive. It

means that what is individual, so far as it is

so, is itself not merely that it is not some-

body else.

He viewed the individual as a world in

itself. He saw the impossibility of one finite person

of experience "possessing as its own exclusive experience

the immediate experience of another."

Corley, pp. 185.
Rosenzweig, p. 10.
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 10.

This is a Berkeleian conception--that the same idea can not be in two minds. Professor William James doubted that Berkeley and his friends saw different towns when walking the streets of London.¹ The fact is, that due to different contents of minds and points of view, Berkeley and his friends did not see exactly the same town; the experience as revealed to them by ideas in the mind was not the same. James could have admitted this and still have believed in the existence of other minds for similar ideas can be in different minds. This Berkeleian conception, though indirectly, Bosanquet confirmed.

b) Social nature built upon distinctness of persons.

But this very distinctness of persons was based upon the social nature of humanity, for following Plato, Bosanquet argued for this distinctness on the ground that every individual has a single and separate work or function in society. The individual is a member of the organic whole. Thus, there is identity in diversity and diversity in identity. There is overlapping of the capacities and contents of minds, but the experiences do not completely repeat each other?

c) Social nature manifested by union with finite spirits.

Bosanquet saw the social nature of man revealed by his association with others. At the same time, he identified strong individuality and strong--

¹James, William, Radical Empiricism, 76-77.
²Bosanquet, VDI, 57.

This is a Berkeleyian conception--that the

same idea can not be in two minds. Professor William

James doubted that Berkeley and his friends saw differences

between when making the assertion of London. The fact is,

that due to different contents of minds and points of view,

Berkeley and his friends did not see exactly the same thing:

the experience as revealed to them by ideas in the mind was

not the same. James could have admitted this and still have

believed in the existence of other minds for similar ideas

can be in different minds. This Berkeleyian conception, though

indirectly, has been admitted.

(b) Social nature built upon individualism

of persons.

But this very distinctness of persons was

based upon the social nature of humanity. For following

him, James argued for this distinctness on the ground

that every individual has a single and separate soul or

function in society. The individual is a member of the

organic whole. Thus, there is identity in diversity and

diversity in identity. There is overlapping of the

experiences and contents of minds, but the experiences do

not completely repeat each other.

(c) Social nature manifested by union with

living entities.

James saw the social nature of man

revealed by his association with others. At the same time,

he identified strong individuality and strong-

social mindedness.

When I most fall short of others,...
I am also least myself... Whenever we are
strong, we come together.¹

The soul is shaped more by social selection, he says, than by natural selection, as "mind has its main environment in mind".² Under the pressure of nature and society, man is made equal to any emergency, made aware of his unity with others and of his own value.³ Thus, Bosanquet has evaluated the individual in terms of his connection with the whole, even as the ancient Greeks placed value upon the person in his relation to the state.

d) Social nature manifested by union with the infinite.

Bosanquet carried the principle much farther; man is not only a member of society; he is a part of the Cosmos, the Absolute. Mackenzie saw this teaching as fundamental in the writings of Bosanquet.

His main contention throughout is that an individual must not be assumed to be an independent entity; and that his life has to be considered in connection with his place in the social unity of which he is a member and in the still more comprehensive unity of the Cosmos.⁴

Bosanquet saw in man a dual nature; finite man possesses an infinite strain. Thus, he is not an individual existent, not an ultimate subject; he does not possess substantive being (except indirectly) but rather adjectival being. Here the monism of Bosanquet is very

¹ Bosanquet, VDI, 59-60.

² Ibid. XXIII.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Mackenzie, J.S. in Rev. of Bosanquet's SP, Mind, 36, 487.

When I read this book of yours...
I am also interested...
strongly, we agree, together.

The goal is shaped more by social values.

Yes, he says, that of natural selection, as "mind has the
main evolutionary in mind." Under the pressure of nature
and society, man is made equal to all emergency, made aware
of his unity with others and of his own value. These
Hobbes has evaluated the individual in terms of his
connection with the whole, even as the student of
history views upon the person in his relation to the state.
d) Social nature manifested by union with

the infinite.

Hobbes has carried the individual to

further: man is not only a member of society; he is a
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ing are fundamental in the writings of Hobbes.

His main connection throughout
is that an individual must not be
assumed to be an independent entity;
and that his life has to be considered
in connection with the place in the
social unity of which he is a member.
and in the still more comprehensive
unity of the Cosmos.

Hobbes has seen in man a dual nature; finite

man possesses an infinite realm. True, he is not an
individual existent, not an abstract subject; he does not
possess substantive being; he is not a thing, but rather
abstract being. Here the notion of Hobbes is very

evident.

Now the doctrine of a single Individual Reality rests on the demonstration that no finite individuals are self-complete and self-contained, and that therefore none such can be self-existing substances or irreducible subjects of prediction.¹

Bosanquet began with the position of Lotze, that to call anything a substance indicates its mode of behavior rather than ascribes to it an "accult somewhat".² He agreed also with Pringle-Pattison in this respect.

We both reject the old doctrine of the soul-substance as a kind of metaphysical atom. We both believe that the mere individual nowhere exists;.. 'Both his existence and his nature ... are derived.' It is absurd to talk of him as self-subsistent or existing in his own right.³

He disagreed with Pringle-Pattison about men's having substantive being, and an adjectival being only in the sense of relation to other reals. He rejected the term "membership" as a description of man's position in the Absolute.⁴ No doctrine of a Monadic self, he asserted, has ever handled properly the self.⁵ He made a strong appeal to the fact of individual differences, such as self-containedness, for instance, to prove that reality is on the exterior of man, and that he is not therefore a substance. When one forgets this, and tries to be self-centered, he becomes a "false appearance", not that he does not appear, but that he appears in a false role.⁶

¹ Bosanquet, LMK, 11, 252;
² Ibid. 253;
³ LFI, 85;

⁴ Ibid. 86;
⁵ LMK, 11, 254-255;
⁶ Ibid. 254.

Thus, Bosanquet insisted upon the definition of individuality at its maximum, looking for the clue to reality in the nature of the individual at the highest point of its self-transcendence.¹ He pointed to the capacity of the finite being to contain that which is contradictory to itself as proof of its infinite nature, revealed by a circle rather than by a straight line.² The infinite is not remote.

So far from the infinite being remote, abstract, unreal, nothing but the infinite can be truly present, concrete, and real.³

The discrepancies to be found in the finite-infinite being in isolation are not ultimate; they disappear when true individuality is won, when the self finds stability and satisfaction in the Absolute.⁴ This is through the process of self-transcendence. The logic of the self endeavors to raise life into a whole.

In this procedure, egoism and altruism are reconciled.⁵ In all moral life there is a giving up and a gaining.⁶ He showed that self-sacrifice is much deeper than the thought of living for others as it depends upon a principle which may involve the sacrifice of others as well, the promotion of values not for the individual but for the whole.⁷ The whole is of more importance than the

¹Bosanquet, PIV, 271, 274;
²PFA, XXVII;
³Ibid. XXVIII;
⁴PIV, 251, 268;

⁵SP, 175;
⁶Ibid. 176;
⁷Ibid. 178.

part. In this, Bosanquet went back to an expression of Aristotle-Toû καλὸν ἐνεκα.

That is to say, it is the recognition by you of your place in the whole which you belong to. ..the quality of unity depending on the self-assertion of the whole in the part.

Stedman saw the centrality of this doctrine of self-transcendence in the system of Bosanquet's thought. He saw it as "an account of the many levels and stages of self-transcendence into which reality is driven in its activity of self-maintenance?"

C. A moral being.

In the third place, man is moral in his nature.

1. Recognized by Bosanquet.

Bosanquet looked upon man as essentially good-will³

He recognized the supremacy of moral ends for man. The law of sacrifice, he said had no special relation to conduct in favor of others, but to moral values, and that the ideals of beauty and truth often demand the sacrifice and suppression of others as well of One's self⁴. He believed in the possibility of moral perfection; with him it was not simply progress

¹Bosanquet, SSE, 3;

²Stedman, Ralph, "An Examination of Bosanquet's Doctrine of Self-Transcendence, I, Mind, (Apr. 1931.) See also

³Bosanquet, SSE, 134; ⁴Wheelerwright, Philip, "The Category of Self-Transcendence as an

Essential Element in the Concept of Personality"; Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, 1926, 121-128.

towards the ideal.

If the ultimate real is progress to the infinite, the gates are closed against perfection¹

There is one road, and one road only,...by which the finite creature can identify itself with perfection, and that begins by accepting perfection as real, while admitting that he cannot attain it in his own right².

He held that when the reality of perfection is denied that the whole content and inspiration of progress goes with it, for it is the spirit of perfection "which demands and secures perfection." ³

2. Emphasized by Sorley.

But the stress upon morality is emphatically Sorley's. In the work to which reference is made most frequently⁴, he seeks for reality from an ethical starting-point, as has been pointed out.⁵

a. True individuality only in persons.

Sorley recognizes only persons as real individuals. In a three-fold division of reality into existents, relations and values, Sorley places in the first class persons, organic life and mere things; and designates persons only as individuals, they alone having intrinsic value⁶. He proved that in the object which is not also a subject, there is no individuality of its own. He could find no sharp line drawn between things. In the science that gives a broader view of individuality than

¹ Bosanquet, VDI, 303;

² Ibid;

³ Ibid. 307.

⁴ Sorley, MVIG;

⁵ Thesis, VIII;

⁶ MVIG, 117, 120.

this", the individual self remains a puzzle or a stumbling block", either not explained or explained away!¹

b. True individuality only in the exercise of free choice, especially of the values of life.

Sorley restricts real individuality not only to persons but to the free choice of persons. They are "centers of conscious activity" characterized by free selection of ends. He accepts the distinction offered by another that "a thing is what it does, but a person is what he is capable of doing."² Especially in the choice of the permanent, catholic, absolute and intrinsic values does one attain, as well as express, real individuality.³ Only persons are producers(or discoverers), realizers, entertainers ("homes"), bearers, conservators, augmentors, and judges of values.⁴ Though he plead for an interest in all values, Sorley restricted morality to the will in relation to the moral ideal. Good-will, he called "a spirit or tendency in which the higher human capacities and the harmony of man triumph over sensual and selfish impulses."⁵ When the higher values are chosen in preference to the lower ones, one achieves them and the good-will of a free man.⁶ Personality is intensified by the attainment of values, intellectual and

¹Sorley, MVIG, 224;

²Ibid. 190;

³Ibid. 40-45;

⁴Ibid. 111, 117, 118, 161, 165, 166;

⁵Ibid. 514;

⁶Ibid. 452.

This, the individual self remains a source of a sense
 of "being" which is not explained or explained away.
 b. True individuality only in the
 exercise of free choice, especially in the value of life.
 Morley reserves the term individuality not
 only to persons but to the free choice of persons. They
 are "centers of conscious activity" distinguished by free
 selection of ends. He accepts the distinction offered by
 another that "a thing is what it does, but a person is
 what he is capable of doing." Especially in the choice of
 the permanent, ethical, absolute and intrinsic values does
 one attain, as well as express, true individuality. Only
 persons are (discovered or discovered), realizers, authentic
 ("persons"), persons, consciousness, and judges of
 values. "Through the quest for an interest in all values,
 Morley reserved morality to the will in relation to the
 moral ideal. Good-will, he called "a spirit or tendency in
 which the other human capacities and the power of man
 stretch over natural and selfish impulses." When the right
 values are chosen in preference to the lower ones, one
 achieves them and the good-will of a true man. Personality
 is distinguished by the attainment of values, intellectual and

Morley, WVO, 222;
 Ibid. 220;
 Ibid. 20-22;
 Ibid. 11, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123;
 Ibid. 214;
 Ibid. 222.

aesthetic among the rest, since they are factors in the completion of purpose, which is an essential aspect of personality¹

d. True individuality to be judged in the light also of its unrealized values, and its uniqueness.

He has affinity with the ideals which he approves even when he fails to follow them; the values are his values and have their root in the nature which he shares with his social environment.²

In this connection, Sorley quotes Plato to the effect that the cause for the fervor of the philosopher's search for truth is in the fact that truth was once a part of him; thus, the affinity between the seeking mind and the sought truth. He points to the heterogeneity of nature as a reflection of the differences in men quoting Heraclitus: "No one descends twice into the same stream."³ One aspect of the uniqueness of man, and thus of his worth, is that he brings into the world final causes by his production of values.⁴

D. A religious being.

In the fourth place, man is religious in his nature.

1. Freely admitted by Sorley.

In religion, Sorley sees that which unifies,

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 166, 241;

² Ibid. 234-235;

³ Ibid. 113;

⁴ Ibid. 167, 169.

essentially among the same, since they are factors in the
formation of nature, which is an essential aspect of

personality.

B. True individuality is not found in
the light of the universal values, and
its uniqueness.

He has identified with the ideas
which he removes even when he tries to
leave them; the values are his values
and have their root in the nature which
he shares with his social environment.

In this connection, Godely quotes Plato as

the effect that the nature for the favor of the nation-

other's nature for truth is in the fact that truth was

once a part of him; thus, the identity between the seeking

mind and the sought truth. He points to the heterogeneity

of nature as a reflection of the differences in the nature

of nature: "No one has ever taken into the same nature."

One aspect of the uniqueness of man, and thus of his nature, is

that he brings into the world that which is his production

of values.

1. A religious being.

In the former place, man is religious in

his nature.

1. Truly admitted by Godely.

In religion, Godely sees that which unifies,

Godely, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940;
1941, 1942, 1943;
1944, 1945;
1946, 1947, 1948.

enriches and empowers the life of man. The moral life is not isolated, is not complete in itself; it is developed in association with church, state, home, country, commerce and culture. The thing that binds these diverse institutions is the religious conception of the world.¹ And when explanation is needed to fill in the general picture that morality offers in the interpretation of the universe and God, it is the religious consciousness that comes forward, for it "claims a more intimate apprehension of God than morality can offer"²

2. Emphatically held by Bosanquet.

a. Reaction against certain ethical conceptions.

The most outstanding feature of the religious attitude of Bosanquet is his reaction against certain ethical conceptions and emphases of the popular ethical societies, especially the neo-realistic and neo-idealistic groups. In these, he says, all that is needed as a creed is the admission that there is duty and happiness and a world to be made better, which is a one-sided outlook.

The passions for nature, or beauty, or morality, or truth, 'may be happiness enough in the lives of some and serve them in the place of religion, but they are not the religious passion and only simulate it'. It seems to me quite plain that this verdict covers the whole of the neo-realistic and neo-idealistic pretension to a religious attitude.³

¹Sorley, ML, 131-132;
²MVIG, 474;
³Bosanquet, MECP, 187.

enriches and empowers the life of man. The world life

is not isolated, it is not complete in itself; it is de-

veloped in association with other people, other countries,

commerce and culture. The thing that binds these diverse

institutions is the religious conception of the world.

And when explanation is needed as to why the religious

picture that we have of the universe is the interpretation of the

universe that we have. It is the religious consciousness that

comes forward, for it holds a more intimate apprehension of

God than otherwise can offer.

2. Emphatically said by Rosenkranz.

3. Reaction against certain ethical con-

ceptions.

The most outstanding feature of the

religious attitude of Rosenkranz is his reaction against

certain ethical conceptions and attitudes of the secular

ethical world, especially the neo-utilitarian and neo-

utilitarian attitude. In these, he says, all that is needed

as a check in the calculation of duty and happiness

and a world as he made better, which is a one-sided outlook.

The reaction to nature, or beauty,

or morality, or truth, may be mentioned enough

in the lives of men and women in the

past of religion, but they are not the

religious reaction and only religiously

to us, the religious reaction is the

the world of the neo-utilitarian and neo-

utilitarian reaction to a religious attitude.

Copy, M. 131-132
1913, 1914
1917, 1918

Bosanquet saw in the philosophy of Gentile a return to Kantian morality, the "ought to be" opposed to the "is", which is a "morality of endless approximation".¹ Bosanquet favored rather the view of a perfect world; of morality as a belief in the good as real and in the bad as unreal; and of religion as that which offers as its characteristic faith that nothing else than the good is real, that the highest assertion is surrender to a higher though not external will, (the will for perfection), that perfection is real, actually present;² religion that furnishes an experience in which the evil of the world and ^{of} the self are absorbed along with the self in this perfection, the Absolute, and in which self-realization is attained.²

Thus it can be seen why Bosanquet had no sympathy for the moralists, those who recognized evil as real, who fought it, and tried to make the world better. To him their devotion to the abstract "ought to be" was not commendable.

b. Morality void of religion.

Bosanquet declared that morality without religion is an impossible attitude.³ Muirhead remarking upon the profound conviction that Bosanquet had of the reality of religious experience, in which man is at his best, said:

While as much opposed as any to a mysticism which lost the finite in the Infinite, he became more and more suspicious of any form of moralism, which denied the presence of the Infinite, as that which is most real in the finite self.⁴

¹Bosanquet, MECP, 123;

²VDI, 242-245;
³SSE, 102;

⁴Muirhead, J.H., "Bernard Bosanquet as I knew Him", Jour. Phil., 20, 677, 675.

...and in the philosophy of Kantianism
 a return to Kantian morality, the "ought to be" opposed to
 the "is", which is a "necessity of a moral action".
 Kantianism favored rather the view of a perfect world of
 morality as a belief in the good as such and in the good as
 universal; and of religion as that which offers us the character-
 istic faith that nothing else than the good is best, that the
 highest satisfaction is contained in a higher thought but external
 will. (This will for perfection, that perfection is best,
 actually presents religion that furnished an explanation in
 terms of the evil of the world and the will and the separated state
 with the self in this perfection, the Absolute, and in which
 self-perfection is attained?

Thus it can be seen why Kantianism led to
 especially for the moralists, those who recognized evil as
 best, and fought it, and tried to make the world better. To
 his faith devotion to the "ought to be" was not necessary.

...religiously void of religion.
 Kantianism declared that morality without
 religion is an impossible ideal. Kantianism remained
 upon the profound conviction that Kantianism had of the
 reality of religious experience, in which man is at his best.

...said:
 While an ethic opposed as such to a
 religion which has the right to be
 religious, or become more and more
 religious of any form of religion, which
 denied the presence of the Infinite, as
 that which is most real in the human self.

Speaking of "Science and Philosophy" by Bosanquet, Picard observed that the editors defended the title on the ground that the author believed that ethics, politics, easthetics and religion speaking broadly are in the scientific field.¹

Bosanquet found that the account of the religious consciousness given by Alexander the realist, James the radical empiricist, and Bradley the Absolutist are much the same. James, he said, concluded that in the religious consciousness "the person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come".² Muirhead states that Bosanquet valued Bradley's "Ethical Studies" because "by demonstrating the incompleteness of the moral consciousness", it "vindicated the appeal to religious experience".³

c. Salvation from isolation.

One is saved not only from sin, but from isolation. In religion thus, Bosanquet saw the principle of unity for monism, carrying it out in the idea of absorption into the infinite. Because it makes one realize his finiteness, and at the same time, his unity with the whole, religion performs a valuable service. It makes man "at home in the universe".⁴ It draws his attention and his hopes away from himself; it saves him from sin and self-contradiction.

For the religious man trusts in no strength of his own, and to be perfect apart from that in which he trusts would be for him sin and self-contradiction.⁵

¹Picard, Maurice, in Rev. of SP, Jour. Phil., 25, 468.

²Bosanquet, MECP, 68-69;

³Muirhead, J.H., "Bernard Bosanquet as I knew Him", Jour. Phil., 20, 675;

⁴Bosanquet, WRI, 3-6; 8-9;

⁵Ibid. 38.

Specimens of "Beliefs and Philosophy" by Rosenberg,

please observe that the author believed the title on the

ground that the author believed that ethics, politics, economics

and religion were all really one in the religious field.

Rosenberg found that the essence of the

religious phenomenon given by Alexander the great, Jesus

the perfect example, and indeed the Absolute are such

the same. Jesus, he said, combined these in the religious con-

sciousness, the person is conscious with a will that through

which saving experience come. "Without this that Rosenberg

values the "Ethical studies" based by Rosenberg

the incompleteness of the world consciousness, is "religious"

and appeal to religious experience."

c. Beliefs from isolation.

One is saved not only from sin, but from

isolation. In religion then, Rosenberg sees the principle of

unity for man, everything is put in the idea of perfection.

into the infinite. Because it makes one realize his finiteness.

and at the same time, his unity with the whole, religious experience

a religious service. It makes man "at home in the universe."

It gives his attention and his hopes away from himself; it saves

him from his self-contradiction.

For the religious man finds in
no extension of his own, and so he perfects
a new form in which he finds a
he for his own self-contradiction.

Beliefs, Rosenberg, in New York, 1911, pp. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

Beliefs, Rosenberg, in New York, 1911, pp. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

d. Clue to reality.

Bosanquet discovered in religion, he believed, the clue to reality. This can be seen at once by recalling the claims that he made for religion and by thinking what is involved in those claims. Religion regards only the good as real; it calls for surrender to a higher will; it saves from isolation and self-contradiction; it brings one into unity with the infinite, and it is in this self-transcendence that self-contradiction ceases; it makes one continuous with a wider self through the religious consciousness. Whether, therefore, good or the Absolute be regarded as the real, it is religion that furnishes the clue.¹ Speaking of the religious man, he said:

At the same time his main experience is the clue to reality....He is filled with 'what is real'. He is never out of reach of the world of values...²

II. Freedom of the Individual.

A. Definitions.

1. The definitions of Bosanquet.

He accepts and interprets one of Bergson's statements.

A free action is one which expresses the whole 'me'...If Bergson has a new point to make in saying it, this point lies in his hostility to our current self. For him, this is a sort of crust over our true or fundamental self...³

In another connection, he follows up this view.

..We hold that no ideal of freedom lies in the direction of isolating the self from the world. Freedom lies in the direction towards unity and coherence.⁴

¹ Thesis, 12-13;

² Bosanquet, WRI, 38-39;

³ SP, 227;

⁴ PIV, 326.

4. One to reality.

However, observed in religion, he believed.

the time to reality. This can be seen as once by revealing the

claim that he was for religion and by thinking what is

involved in those claims. Religion regards only the good as

real; it says for example, as a higher will; it says from

realism and self-contradiction; it brings out into reality what

the infinite, and it is in this self-transcendence that self-

contradiction ceases; it makes one continuous with a wider self

through the religious consciousness. Whether, therefore, good

on the Absolute be regarded as the real, it is religion that

translates the ideal, the religious, and, he said:

At the same time his own experience is
the time to reality.... He is filled with what is
real. He is never out of touch with the world of
reality....

II. Freedom of the Individual.

A. Religion.

1. The Definition of Religion.

It accepts and interprets one of being-

man's existence.

A true religion is one which expresses the
whole 'self'. If religion has a new power to make
in saying it, this being the self, this is the reality
of our current self. For this, this is a word of
power over our time or fundamental self....

In another connection, he follows up

this view.

.. We hold that no ideal of freedom
lies in the direction of isolating the
self from the world. Freedom lies in the
direction towards unity and coherence.

1. Thesis, pp. 15-16;
2. Introduction, pp. 15-16;
3. pp. 15-16;
4. pp. 15-16.

The self is "the active form of totality" which strives towards unity and coherence, whose self-determination is that of a logical world.¹ In view of this he gave a restricted definition, when he defined freedom as man's character in morality and religion.²

2. The statement of Sorley.

The following may be taken as expressing Sorley's view.

The self is the cause of its own actions; and each action although connected with the past is yet a choice determined by itself, a true creation.³

B. Importance of Freedom.

It is Sorley who most clearly reveals the importance of freedom.

1. Relation to unity of reality.

After affirming that the world is a purposive system, Sorley turns to the individual with his purposes and his certain spontaneity of action, and discusses the bearing of the problem of freedom upon the interpretation of the unity of reality. To attribute freedom to the individual means, he says, to "limit the psychical unity of the universe", and to give a meaning to its "causal connectedness" which is not its "most obvious one"⁴ That is, personal freedom and causal law seem to be at odds. In its proper place,⁵ his conception of this seeming conflict will be brought out more fully. Just here all that is required is to understand that Sorley grasped clearly the importance of freedom in that

¹ Bosanquet, PIV, 335;

² SP, 105;

³ Sorley, MVIG, 449;

⁴ Ibid. 429;

⁵ Thesis, 21-23.

The unit is "the active form of reality"

which involves power, unity and coherence, whose self-

determining is that of a logical world. In view of this he

gave a historical definition, when he defined freedom as man's

character in conformity with reality.

3. The statement of Sorley.

The following may be taken as expressing

Sorley's view.

The unit is the cause of its own
actions; and even action although connected
with the past is yet a choice determined
by itself, a free causality.

2. Importance of freedom.

It is Sorley who most strongly repeats the

importance of freedom.

1. Relation to unity of reality.

After affirming that the world is a uni-

positive system, Sorley turns to the individual and his

purpose and his certain responsibility of action, and discusses

the bearing of the problem of freedom upon the interpretation

of the unity of reality. To attribute freedom to the individual

means, he says, to "link the psychological unity of the individual"

and to give a meaning to his "personal connectedness" which is

not the "most obvious one". That is, personal freedom and

causal law seem to be at odds. In the present sense, the top-

caption of this section will be brought out more fully.

Just here all that is required is to understand that Sorley

expressed clearly the importance of freedom in that

1. Sorley, *Philosophy*, p. 333;

2. *Ibid.*, p. 100;

3. Sorley, *Philosophy*, p. 489;

4. *Ibid.*, p. 489;

5. *Ibid.*, p. 489.

he saw its connection with the unity of reality.

2. Relation to value.

When it is recalled that Sorley placed emphasis upon the choice of humanity in relation to values, and their connection with human and divine purpose,¹ the importance of freedom in his eyes can be further gleaned. For God is contemplated as communicating freedom to men that they may attain the values which only free beings can realize and enjoy. That is, men are free to work out both the purposes of God and their own, to which both nature and history are subordinate.² Thus, Sorley brings God and man together at this point of freedom, where it is the most natural course, in view of the dualism that seems to be immanent in the conception of human and divine freedom, to separate them. God's purpose that values should be realized by man and in man is accomplished through man's choice of these values, and thus through his freedom.

C. Danger of Freedom.

This brings to the front at once the thought of the danger involved in freedom.

1. Sorley's view.

a. In choice and abuse of freedom.

A good choice presupposes a bad choice; the use of freedom involves its abuse; choice of the good carries with it an open path towards the alternative; the possibility of ^ucoöperation with God in the realization of

¹Thesis, 8-11.

²Sorley, MVIG, 502.

he saw the connection with the unity of reality.

2. Relation to values.

When it is recalled that Kierkegaard placed

emphasis upon the choice of humanity in relation to values,

and their connection with human and divine purposes, the

importance of freedom in his eyes can be further glimpsed.

For God is contemplated as commanding freedom to men that

they may attain the values which only free beings can realize

and enjoy. Thus it is, and one lives to work out both the

purposes of God and their own, and which both human and divine

are subordinated. Thus, Kierkegaard brings God and man together

at this point of freedom, where it is the most natural center

in view of the dualism that seems to be inherent in the con-

ception of human and divine freedom, its essence that God's

purpose that values should be realized by man and its way is

accomplished through man's choice of these values, and thus

through his freedom.

3. Danger of Freedom.

This brings us to the third of our three points.

of the danger involved in freedom.

1. Kierkegaard's view.

a. In choice and action of freedom.

A good choice presupposes a bad choice; but

use of freedom involves its abuse; choice of the good

carries with it an open path towards the alternative; the

possibility of cooperation with God in the realization of

His purposes presuppose the peril of conflict in the refusal to recognize the primacy of those purposes; the privilege of partnership with God is paralleled by the penalty upon estrangement from God. Multitudes of spirits will fail forever to realize the good¹ It would seem that God's gift of freedom to man was a dangerous gift; but the danger is not in the freedom but in its abuse. That is, Sorley deals with the problem of evil in such a way that he leaves room for a personal benevolent God and for human freedom.

b. Not necessarily in pain or in an imperfect world.

Viewing the world as a field for the realization of goodness, Sorley looked upon pain as a possible helper in that realization. An imperfect world, also, instead of being a foe is a friend to such a process, an absolute essential in the development of character² All this is consistent with the goodness of God mentioned above.

2. Bosanquet's view.

a. In pleasure and pain.

Bosanquet, on the other hand, called pleasure and pain the great hazards. Both he and Sorley had steered clear of the difficulty to which idealists are liable, that of ignoring the problem of evil;³ both faced it; neither denied the existence of evil. To Bosanquet, evil and pain

¹ Sorley, MVIC. 502, 473, 471;

² Ibid. 347;

³ Thesis, II.

instead of being illusions were essential features of Reality.¹ Evil is made of the same material as the good² It does not, strangely, interfere with the stability of the self³ Yet in another connection, he admitted that a habit, course of conduct, and a habitual desire could interfere with our best, that it could silence or weaken our will to the good⁴ He saw the possibility of the habit, the conduct, and the desire becoming colored or infected by the evil, but evidently did not see the seriousness of its effects upon the character, nor its further consequences, as Sorley saw them. He saw that suffering was much wider than sin, and could discover no escape from it; instead of religious faith promising exemption, it seemed to declare suffering to be inevitable.⁵

b. In finiteness.

Bosanquet finds the explanation of danger not in wrong choices, but in the finite condition of man. He excused evil; it can't be helped. "It is the narrowness of man's mind which makes him do wrong."⁶ "Moral evil is good hostile to good,"⁷ "...Made out of the same stuff".⁸

...The evil self is a case of the logical striving of the self after unity, which has brought it into contradiction with a fuller and sounder striving.⁹

On the view here accepted finiteness, pain and evil are essential features of reality.¹⁰

¹Bosanquet, PIV, 240-241;

²Ibid. 205;

³Ibid. 202; See b. below.

⁴SSE, 110;

⁵WRI, 53-54;

⁶SSE, 106;

⁷PIV, 352;

⁸SSE, 113;

⁹PIV, 351;

¹⁰Ibid. 240-241.

instead of being identical with essential features of reality. Evil is said to be the same as the good. It does not, strangely, interfere with the reality of the world. Yet in another connection, we admitted that a devil, source of trouble, and a spiritual master could interfere with our peace, that is could bring us nearer to the good. He can also possibility of the devil, the goodness, and the divine character of the world as indicated by the evil, but which did not see the seriousness of its effects upon the character, nor its further consequences, as Hitler saw them. He saw that suffering was worse than pain, and that it was no escape from it; instead of relieving it, it was something added, it seemed to be the suffering to be avoided.

1. In this sense.

Hitler's idea of the existence of danger not in wrong choices, but in the total condition of man. He excused evil; it was to be helped. "It is the nature of man's mind which says that a woman," Hitler said, "is not hostile to good," "...made out of one very thing."

...The evil will is a case of the logical analysis of the will after unity, which was brought in into consideration with a Hitler and a number of things.

On the view here presented, Hitlerism, pain and evil are essential features of reality.

1. Rosenberg, IV, 240-241;	2. Ibid., 241.
3. Ibid., 241; see also, 242.	4. Ibid., 241.
5. Ibid., 241.	6. Ibid., 241.
7. Ibid., 241.	8. Ibid., 241.

If the danger then is in finiteness, there is no escape, that is as long as one remains finite. Even after one has risen above finiteness into the infinite, the Real, the danger trails along, for finiteness, pain and evil are in the Absolute, essential features of reality. In view of this, it would seem that Bosanquet would sit back and let nature take its course; there seems to be no hope of escape from danger and suffering either in time or in eternity. But he declares that evil must be overcome.¹ How? By "feeling" that it is overcome, and by regarding it as conquered. He sees an analogy between this, his faith, the faith of the one who "claims the good" in spite of his badness, on the one hand, and the justifying faith of religion, on the other?²

Thus, Bosanquet and Sorley stand far apart both on the seriousness of the danger and its sources.

D. Limitation of Freedom.

1. Dualism in both human and divine freedom.

Sorley squarely confronts the problem of how the agency of both God and man is to be conceived without an arbitrary dualism which treats God as if He were simply one member in a finite relationship. He rejects the answer which would mark off separate fields for the activity of God and of man, as it is impossible to divide man's life into two totally different spheres.³

¹Bosanquet, SSE, 93, 96;

²Ibid. 101; see also 100.

³Sorley, MVIG, 470, 501, -502.

If the danger there is in finalism, there is no escape, that is as long as one remains finite. Even after one has risen above finalism into the infinite, the goal, the danger exists alone, for finalism, with all its force in the absolute, essential character of reality. In view of this, it would seem that Rosenzweig would turn his back and let nature take its course; there seems to be no hope of escape from danger and suffering either in time or in eternity. But he declares that evil must be overcome. How? By "letting" that it is overcome, and by regarding it as conquered. He sees an analogy between this, his faith, the faith of the one who "chooses the good" in spite of his misfortune, on the one hand, and the Jewish faith of religion, on the other.

Thus, Rosenzweig and Gershom Scholem stand far apart.

Both on the seriousness of the danger and its sources.

B. Limitation of Freedom.

1. Creation is both danger and divine

freedom.

Scholem severely confronts the problem of

how the agency of both God and man is to be connected

without an arbitrary dualism which treats God as if He

were merely one member in a finite relationship. He rejects

the answer which would make all separate fields for the

activity of God and of man, as it is impossible to divide

man's life into two totally different spheres.

Rosenzweig, 222, 23, 25;
Scholem, 101; see also 100.
Rosenzweig, 270, 201, 202.

The doctrine of "irresistible grace" he finds inconsistent with the picture of the deity who says, "Behold I stand at the door and knock".¹ It is in answering that call and working to fulfill the divine purposes that man finds his freedom. Love works through freedom. Thus in the love of God and in man's coöperation with God Sorley finds the solution of the apparent dualism.² In His love, God who has the power, does not force open the door into any life. It is self-limitation.³ And the same principle applies to man, who with freedom, the power to bar the door, opens it to entertain deity and divine purposes, because of love to God. Sorley does not apply the Scripture reference above in so many words, but the thought is there.

2. Man's freedom limited by both God and nature.

Self-determination is complete only in the infinite. God is not limited by anything external to Himself. Rather than the creation of persons being a limitation upon God's power, it is a manifestation of that power, for "a higher range of power and perfection is shown in the creation of free beings than in the creation of beings whose every thought and action are predetermined by their Creator"⁴. But man is limited by both God and nature. As was shown above, however the limitation, as respects God is not complete. Nor is it complete from the side of nature. Standing between the realms of goodness and nature, man is

¹Ibid. 503, on Rev.3:21, suggested by Pringle-Pattison in Idea of God.

²Ibid. 504;

³Ibid. 469;

⁴Ibid.

incompletely determined by forces outside of him. Nature is animated by purposes¹. Then man is limited by heredity as well as by environment, and by the past and his own physical conditions, the mind working through the body, which is governed by physical laws².

A man cannot at will choose to be a mathematician, an artist, a statesman, or even a millionaire³.

This limitation is a limitation of experience. Then Sorley gives a hint of the necessity of limitation. Were each being unlimited in freedom, each would need a world of his own to run and there would be no universe.²

But though limited in some respects, man has always before him good and evil as possible objects of free choice.³ Everyone can be good.

3. The freedom of man limited by the Absolute.

Bosanquet saw that man is limited. The finite self is "a partial world".⁴ The soul moulds and is moulded.⁵ It is a stream within the Absolute, of "varying breadth, intensity and separateness from the great flood within which it moves".⁶ This is the language of limitation. He like Sorley views the limitation as partial; the "impossible" is only relative, for finite circumstances "cannot stand against will and character".⁷

¹Sorley, MVIG, 427, 446-447;

²Ibid. 449-450, 469-470;

³Ibid. 470.

⁴Bosanquet, VDI, 4;

⁵Ibid. 96;

⁶Ibid. 129;

⁷Ibid. 109.

is governed by physical laws. In the last condition, the law working through the body, which is well as by environment, and by the past and his own physical condition by himself. Then man is limited by himself.

A man cannot as will choose to be a mathematician, an artist, a statesman, or even a philosopher.

This limitation is a limitation of experience. When Godley gives a hint of the necessity of limitation, there seems being realized in freedom, and would need a world of his own to run and there is no answer.

But freedom limited in some respects, and has since before the good and evil as possible objects of free choice. Questions can be asked.

3. The freedom of man limited by the Absolute.

Godley has seen that man is limited. The finite will be a perfect world. The soul would be in freedom. It is a creature within the Absolute, always growing, infinitely and eternally from the great flood which is the source. This is the language of intuition. He like Godley views the limitation as partial; the "impossible" is only relative, for finite objectness cannot stand against will and character.

Godley, Wm. 444-447;
Lila, 444-445, 446-447;
Lila, 445.
Hawthorne, Wm. 444;
Lila, 445;
Lila, 446;
Lila, 447.

E. Elimination of Freedom.

1. By determinism, materialism and naturalism.

Determinism, materialism and naturalism in their denial of human freedom are naturally opposed by our idealistic writers. Rejecting, as has been shown,¹ the doctrine of "irresistible grace", Sorley makes an important distinction, one between universal determinism, which denies freedom, and universal knowledge, which does not. God foresaw that some spirits would thwart his plans. Sorley faced with the question that naturally arises, Why did God create these spirits then?, answers that God has had eternally a moral purpose for the universe, and that it will be worked out--through finite beings. Yet man is free to make these purposes his own. Thus, fore-knowledge is not the same as predestination.²

Sorley sees in the theory of determinism the tendency to be driven back upon the definition of cause as "the agent or producing power" and declares that the agent is not determined in the causation.³

He makes it clear that the acceptance of the belief in the uniformity of nature does not eliminate freedom, though it may seem that personal freedom and causal law, he remarks, is that every event is the effect of something else, which we designate a cause..But the assertion of personal freedom is not the denial of cause, ~~as but~~.

¹Thesis, 20.

²Sorley, MVIG, 472;

³Ibid. 438-439.

1. The first of these is the

2. The second is the

3. The third is the

4. The fourth is the

5. The fifth is the

6. The sixth is the

7. The seventh is the

8. The eighth is the

9. The ninth is the

10. The tenth is the

11. The eleventh is the

12. The twelfth is the

13. The thirteenth is the

14. The fourteenth is the

15. The fifteenth is the

16. The sixteenth is the

17. The seventeenth is the

18. The eighteenth is the

19. The nineteenth is the

20. The twentieth is the

21. The twenty-first is the

22. The twenty-second is the

23. The twenty-third is the

24. The twenty-fourth is the

25. The twenty-fifth is the

26. The twenty-sixth is the

27. The twenty-seventh is the

28. The twenty-eighth is the

29. The twenty-ninth is the

30. The thirtieth is the

rather the assertion that "self is the cause".¹

Bosanquet contends that instead of his making concessions to determinism, materialism and naturalism, that he has the only conception that will save freedom.² Only probable prediction of man's actions is possible. In this, he follows Bergson.

By calculation, after the manner of astronomy, you can never predict a course of consciousness....You can predict, of course, probably, from knowledge of individual character, and its expression in analogous situations.³

This evidently gave Bosanquet a clue. If only probable prediction is possible when applied to mankind, and if that depends upon knowledge of the character of the person who is the object of the prediction, then one can predict concerning another to the extent of being one with him. Here he leaves Bergson and maintains that we are the same with others to a large degree.⁴ This is in line with his main thesis, that persons, to a greater or less extent, are bound up in the whole, and that there is a general will.

He agrees with Sorley that "Individuality" and "Spontaneity" are not contrary to uniformity in nature, but rather "include and necessitate them".⁵ But the right interpretation must be put upon these terms, if there is to be no opposition of thought. Individuality can not mean "empty eccentricity"; it must belong to a system which is "self-contained and coherent".⁶

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 430-431;

² Bosanquet, PIV, 319-320;

³ SP, 230;

⁴ Ibid. 235;

⁵ PIV, 119;

⁶ Ibid. 120.

...the question that "what is the answer?"

Husserl's concept of the essence of his method

conceptions of determinism, materialism and naturalism

that he has the only conception that will save freedom. But

propositional knowledge of man's actions is possible. In this

he follows Hegel.

By calculation, after the manner of
astronomy, we can even predict a course of
events... The law of causality, of course,
prohibits the knowledge of individual
character, and the knowledge of individual
situations.

This is what Husserl's view is.

only propositional knowledge is possible when applied to nature

and it does depend upon knowledge of the properties of the

person who is the object of the prediction. Then one can

predict accurately whether to the extent of being one with

him. But he leaves Husserl and maintains that we are the

same with others to a large degree. This is in line with

his main thesis, that persons, to a certain extent, are

the same in the whole, and that there is a general will.

He agrees with Kant that "individuality"

and "personality" are not contrary to universality in nature.

But rather "include and necessitate them". But the right

interpretation must be put upon these terms, if there is

to be no opposition at all. Individuality and not man

"empty essentiality"; it must belong to a system which is

"self-contained and coherent".

1. Husserl, *WVIO*, 230-231;
2. Husserl, *WV*, 230-231;
3. *ibid.*, 230;
4. *ibid.*, 231;
5. *ibid.*, 231;
6. *ibid.*, 231.

Bosanquet seems strong upon human freedom; he calls every step in life a creation, "at every step" an alternative is present, with the result that new shape is given the individual and the situation.¹ Yet, he admits that the individual seems bound. "It must pursue the logic of the self; it must work out its nisus to the whole;..."

Here is a "must", an emphatic "must" that seems to be inconsistent with the "creation at every step". But Bosanquet denies that giving a being a nature gives it a necessity.³

2. By monism.

Sorley goes beyond Bosanquet in the matter, declaring that not only do determinism, materialism and naturalism eliminate freedom, but that monism does likewise. For he shows that thorough-going monism has no place for either individual purpose or freedom. It denies freedom, he says, as out of harmony with the unity of the whole. Monism must give up either the moral order or the natural order. It can't reconcile them, and it can't call either an illusion.⁴

3. By the "strongest motive".

Then freedom is ~~said to be eliminated by~~ the "strongest motive" theory.

a. The contribution of Bosanquet.

¹Bosanquet, SSE, 151;

²VDI, 6;

³Ibid. 7.

⁴Sorley, MVIG, 393-394.

Bonhoeffer seems strong upon human freedom; he calls every man in life a decision, "at every step" an alternative is present, with the result that now there is given the individual and the situation. Yet, he admits that the individual seems to be "in a trap". It is not because the logic of the self; it may work out the same to the end... "There is a 'trap', an existential 'trap' seems to be inconsistent with the 'decision at every step'. But Bonhoeffer denies that giving a being a nature gives it a necessity."

2. By nature.

Bonhoeffer goes beyond Bonhoeffer in the matter, deciding that not only is determinism, materialism and naturalism eliminate freedom, but that man does live also. For he shows that through-freedom man has no place for either individual purpose or freedom. It denies freedom, he says, as out of harmony with the unity of the whole. Man must give up either the moral order or the natural order. It can't reconcile them, and it can't call either an illusion."

3. By the "strongest motive".

Then freedom is eliminated by the "strongest motive", hence.
 4. The continuation of Bonhoeffer.

¹Bonhoeffer, etc., 1931;
²Vol. 2;
³Ibid. 7.
⁴Bonhoeffer, etc., 303-304.

Bosanquet does not contribute much in defense of freedom against the attack of the advocates of the "strongest motive". It is true that he quotes with approval a statement of Bergson that may bear upon the issue-"To act without reason is often the best reason".

What does guide us when we are free is differently phrased as 'the total of our sentiments', 'our personal idea of happiness and honour'.¹

Yet he neutralized the effect of this by saying that the individual will is shaped by its dominant ideas.²

b. The contribution of Sorley.

Sorley says that the only basis for the "strongest motive" is the weak basis of psychological hedonism, which purports to give measurements. His chief objection to it is that it treats motives as if they had an independent existence and each a measurable strength.

The assumption overlooks the fact that the motive exists only for the self-conscious being whose motive it is. Apart from the self it is nothing.³

There is no predicting what a particular motive will do either in humanity or in the individual, for man expresses individuality "not only by confirming our expectations, but also by the surprises he gives us."⁴

F. Location of Freedom.

In place of the abstract question, "Is man free?", Bosanquet suggested that we ask, "When, in

¹ Bosanquet, SP, 227;
² Ibid. 260;

³ Sorley, MVIG, 436;
⁴ Ibid. 438.

Therefore does not constitute such in

defense of freedom against the attack of the advocates of
the "extraneous motive". It is true that he quotes with
approval a statement of Deussen that may have been the
issue "to act without reason is often the best reason".

But does this mean we are free to
deliberately choose as the basis of our
action, "our personal idea of happiness
and comfort"?

Yes he admitted the effect of this by
saying that the individual will be shaped by the dominant
ideas.

5. The conception of motive.
Dewey says that the only basis for the
"extraneous motive" is the weak basis of psychological
hedonism, which purports to give us pleasure. His chief
objection to it is that it treats motives as if they
had an independent existence and such a miserable strength.

The assumption overlooks the fact
that the motive exists only for the self-
conscious being whose motive it is. Apart
from the self it is nothing.

There is no question what a particular
motive will do either in humanity or in the individual.
For man expresses individuality not only by controlling
our expectations, but also by the surprise he gives us.

6. Location of freedom.
In place of the abstract question, "Is
man free?" Deussen suggested that we ask, "When, in

what, and as what, does man carry out his will with the least hindrance and with fullest satisfaction?"¹

1. In the spiritual, supra-sensuous world.

The form of the question above indicates that Bosanquet does not place man's freedom in his will, for when freedom is placed in the will, there is no problem in obstacles in the way of its being carried out. He explains, though not clearly, the root of will:

A limited externality has set up its center and representative; but its representative being as such an active unity, must tend to become its critic and its re-creator.³

The will has access to "a larger point of view", the Absolute, which furnishes it with plenty of material. Thus Bosanquet finds freedom in a world above the material, and his will in a will above his own.⁴

2. In a temporal world and in self.

Kant had put freedom outside of time, in a transcendental world. Sorley says that this can not be done, that we can not admit only one free act, for "the free act unites successive moments of time into a unity of purpose. It connects them into a single span".⁵ In objecting to Kant's account of freedom, Sorley has indirectly set aside that of Bosanquet's.

Sorley places freedom not only in time, but also, and contrary to Bosanquet, in the self, more specifically; in the choice of the self. Freedom is best seen the

¹ Bosanquet, PFA, XXVIII;

² Ibid. XXIX;

³ VDI, 96;

⁴ SP, 105-106.

⁵ Sorley, MVIG, 450-451.

...and as that, how can carry out his will with the

lowest hindrance and with least resistance?

I. In the spiritual, super-sensuous world.

The form of the question above indicated

that Rosenkranz does not place man's freedom in his will,

for when freedom is placed in the will, there is no

problem in connection with the way of its being carried out.

He explains, though not clearly, the root of will:

A limited externally has set up
its center and representative; but the
representative being as such an active
entity, must seek to become its center and
its representative.

The will has become its higher point of

view, the Absolute, which formulates its will of

material. Thus Rosenkranz finds freedom in a world above

the material, and his will in a will above his own.

2. In a temporal world and in time.

Kant had the freedom outside of time, in

a transcendental world. Kant says that this can not be

done, that we can not admit only one law, for "the free

not unite successive moments of time into a unity of

purpose. It connects them into a single open." In object-

ing to Kant's account of freedom, Schlegel has indirectly

not made that of Rosenkranz's.

Schlegel places freedom not only in time, but

also, and contrary to Rosenkranz, in the self, more precisely

in the choice of the self. Freedom is seen in

1 Rosenkranz, p. 111.
2 Ibid. p. 111.
3 Ibid. p. 111.
4 Ibid. p. 111.
5 Ibid. p. 111.

selection between alternatives. Though not alone in the act of choosing (predispositions and suggestions coming to him from race and environment), one is free to follow or refuse the suggestions.¹ Sorley saw the fallacy of attributing freedom to character and withholding it from action, if actions are predetermined then character is also, because of the modifying power of actions upon character.

The simple truth is that on the determinist view both character and action in all cases proceed from two cooperative causes and from no others--heredity and environment.²

3. When is man really free?

Bosanquet agreed with Bergson that many people never do a free action, that is, that they act from routine.

They never enter into themselves and ask themselves what they, as complete personalities, really want.³

Trivial choices, in which there is no vibration of the whole personality, are not tests of freedom.⁴

a. Making great, logical choices.

Man is really free, decided Bosanquet, when he is making great, logical choices, those which stretch over the years, which express the whole self,⁵ and which have for their object the universal.

It is only what is universal that is free from self-contradiction. It is only what is free from self-contradiction that can be willed without obstruction.⁶

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 451-452;
² Ibid. 400
³ Bosanquet, SP, 228;

⁴ Ibid. 233;
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid. 105.

selection between alternatives. Though not alone in the
set of choosing (propositions and suggestions coming to
him from both mind and environment), one in case to follow up
the suggestions. I believe the lack of attention
freedom to character and withholding is from action. It
actions are predetermined then character is also. Because
of the conflicting power of actions upon character.

The simple truth is that on the
determining view both character and action
in all cases proceed from the cooperative
cause and from no other--freedom and
environment.

3. When is man really free?
Freedom is expressed with regard to that way
people never do free action, that is, that they act
from routine.

They never enter into decisions
and are themselves what they are compelled
personally, really free.

Trivial objects, in which there is no
variation of the whole personality, are not tests of
freedom.

4. Making great, logical choices.
Man is really free, decided messenger, when
he is making great, logical choices, those which answer
over the years, which express the whole self, and which
have the whole object the universal.

It is only what is universal that is
free from self-determination. It is only what
is free from self-determination that can be called
without question.

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b. Making moral choices.

Sorley, on the other hand, answers that a man is really free in the choice of higher values in preference to the lower ones, winning thus, the good-will of a free man.¹

III. Position of the Individual in Reality.

A Introduction.

1. Reality is knowable.

Both writers defended this proposition. We are experiencing reality all the time, contends Bosanquet; and to the measure of our social-mindedness.² Sorley with his characteristic emphasis upon moral ideas found in them the clue to reality.³ The moral judgment is as valid as any judgment in the natural sciences; in neither case is knowledge immediate; in both cases, knowledge is mediated through a judgment passed upon a particular situation⁴; the judgment being objective.⁵ Thus, the objects of moral judgment can be known.

2. The interpretation of reality.

a. Bosanquet rejected the interpretations of naturalism, pluralism and theism.

He denied that time is real, and that it is any index to reality.⁶

¹

²Sorley, MVIG, 452.

³Thesis, 6.

⁴Sorley, MVIG, 4-5;

⁵Ibid. 91-92;

⁶Ibid. 96;

Bosanquet, "In What Sense, if any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?", Mind, 6, 229-231.

1. Making moral choices.

2. On the other hand, however, that a

man is really free in the choice of higher values in

reference to the lower ones, winning thus, the good-will

of the lower world.

III. Position of the Individual in Reality.

A. Introduction.

1. Reality is knowledge.

Both spheres delineated this proposition. We

are acquainted with reality all the time, constantly, unconsciously.

and to the measure of our social-mindedness. Society with

its characteristic attitude upon moral ideas found in them

the clue to reality. The moral judgment is as valid as any

judgment in the natural sciences; in neither case is knowledge

immediate; in both cases, knowledge is mediated through a

judgment passed upon a particular situation; the judgment

being objective. Thus, the subject of moral judgment can be

known.

2. The interpretation of reality.

a. Background against the interpretation

of naturalism, spiritualism and idealism.

We denied that time is real, and that it is

any index to reality.

Society, W. H. O. 1910, 1911.

Thesis, 1911.

Society, W. H. O. 1910, 1911.

Alibi, 1911.

Alibi, 1911.

Background "In what sense, if any, do Time and Nature Time

Exist?" W. H. O. 1910-1911.

Sorley understood this to be the position of Bosanquet.¹ Neither is the self real, that is per se. The sharing of reality is a matter of degree. This is brought out by Bosanquet in the statement of purpose in one of his lectures, as, "An attempt to show how the reality and value of all things in the universe depend on the degree of their embodiment of the principle of individuality-the completeness, coherence, or self-containedness of the universe".² As has been shown,³ Bosanquet was not a personalist. Reality is not a Person. Bosanquet rejected the Kantian conception of a personal Creator and Governor of the world.⁴

b. Bosanquet's own conception of reality.

Reality is One, an Organism of finite individuals, The Individual, The Absolute, The Universe.⁵ Mackenzie brings out a fine distinction in the following quotation from Bosanquet, thereby giving us a positive idea of the Absolute. "After all, the Absolute needs us and our conduct just as we need it".⁶ Mackenzie, in the same connection, commenting upon this says:

It would seem that the Absolute cannot be simply identified with the total world or Cosmos...: the Absolute thought of as needing us just as we need it, would seem to be one aspect of the Cosmos, just as we are another.

¹ Sorley, "Time and Reality", Mind,
² Bosanquet, VDI, XIX.
³ Thesis, 111.

⁴ Bosanquet, PIV, 156;
⁵ Ibid. 27-28; VDI, XIX;
⁶ Mackenzie, J.S., Rev. of Bosanquet's SP, Mind, 36, 448.

reality is a matter of degree. This is brought out by
 Bergson in the statement of purpose in one of his
 lectures. "An attempt to show how the reality and value
 of all things in the universe depend on the degree of
 their embodiment of the principle of individuality-the
 completeness, coherence, or self-containedness of the
 universe." As has been shown, Bergson was not a
 personalist. Reality is not a person. Bergson rejected
 the Kantian conception of a personal Creator and Governor
 of the world.
 b. Bergson's own conception of reality.
 Reality is one, an Order of things
 individuals, the individual, the Absolute, the Universe.
 Bergson brings out a clear distinction in the following
 quotation from Bergson, thereby giving us a positive idea
 of the Absolute. "After all, the Absolute needs us and our
 conduct just as we need it." "The Absolute, in the same manner,
 too, commenting upon this says:

It would seem that the Absolute cannot
 be simply identified with the total world of
 things... the Absolute is not a person, it is not a thing,
 just as we need it, would seem to be the opposite
 of the Common, that we are created.

Bergson, "Time and Reality," Phil.
 Bergson, Phil., XIX.
 Bergson, Phil., XIX.
 Bergson, Phil., XIX.
 Bergson, Phil., XIX.

It may be that the pen of Bosanquet slipped here, for the general impression created by him is that the Absolute is the whole; monism can not admit two aspects of reality. Perhaps, however, Mackenzie's comment is an overrefinement.

Perfection is not, as many moralists hold, simply progress towards the ideal; it is real.¹ The religious consciousness is part of reality; this is in harmony with the emphasis of Bosanquet upon religion.² The finite world is not an illusion; it is a "Vale of soul making".³ Mackenzie makes this position of Bosanquet clear.⁴ Then Bosanquet held the reality of a "general will", the will of all finite beings.⁵ It is part of his teaching of the whole being an organism, and of the possibility of lives crossing, and sharing experiences. Finally, Bosanquet affirmed the reality of eternity. Time is only an appearance.⁶

C. The bearing of this upon the position of the individual in reality.

All this is relevant to the problem of the place of the person in reality. For instance, Bosanquet saw the connection of the conception of time with life, morality and religion.⁷

d. Sorley's view of reality.

The interpretation of reality was the goal Sorley had in mind when he wrote his greatest book.⁸

¹Bosanquet, VDI, 303;

²Ibid. 229, 232, 239;

³Ibid, 92;

⁴Mackenzie, J.S., Rev. Of Bosanquet's SP, Mind, 36, 487.

⁵Bosanquet, "The Notion of a General Will," Mind, 29, 77, 81;

⁶VDI, 295-296;

⁷Sorley, "Time and Reality", Mind, 32, 146;

⁸MVIG, 1.

He pursues the quest of reality in the usual idealistic way, by reference to experience, as has been shown.¹

Human experience is material for science and philosophy.²

1) Law for the interpretation of reality.

Sorley supplies a law for the interpretation of reality in the mandate that one portion of experience must be interpreted by another portion. He adds that in the appeal to experience, all experience must be included.³

2) Three divisions of reality.

He divides reality into three classes,⁴ existents (persons, including the Supreme Person), things and organic life, relations, objective and internal (in the sense of being within the whole), and values.

By linking persons and values, Sorley has reinforced his argument for the objective reality of both. Values are real because they are conserved and enjoyed by persons, as well as because of their objective nature, existing independently of "a temporal manifestation of reality"⁵. Not only then, is the individual real as having intrinsic value, but as a discoverer, bearer and conservator of value. Persons alone have intrinsic value. The opposition of Sorley to any impersonalistic view of reality, such as the belief in general will held by Bosanquet, is seen in the statement of Sorley that reality is not in society. "The social mind is realised and real in individual minds and nowhere else".⁶

¹ Thesis, 1K.

² Sorley, MVIG, 25;

³ Ibid. 290;

⁴ Ibid. 1180121;

⁵ Sorley, MVIG, 172, 174-175;

⁶ Ibid. 185, 241.

He pursues the quest of reality in the usual idealistic

way, by reference to experience, as has been shown.¹

But experience is essential for science and philosophy.²

1) Law for the interpretation of reality.

Society supplies a law for the interpretation of reality.

of reality in the manner that one notion of experience

must be interpreted by another notion. He says that in

the appeal to experience, all experience must be included.³

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reinforced his argument for the objective reality of persons.

Values are real because they are conserved and enjoyed by

persons, as well as because of their objective nature.

existing independently of a temporal realization of reality.⁵

Not only then, is the individual real as having intrinsic

value, but as a discoverer, bearer and conservator of value.

Persons alone have intrinsic value. The opposition of Sorley

to any instrumentalistic view of reality, such as the belief in

General will held by Rousseau, is seen in the statement of

Sorley that reality is not in society. "The social will is

realized and real in individual minds and nowhere else."⁶

1. Theistic, etc.
2. Sorley, *Will*, 201.
3. Ibid., 200.
4. Ibid., 110-111.
5. Sorley, *Will*, 170-171.
6. Ibid., 101, 201.

Yet Sorley makes, perhaps an even clearer statement of the unity of reality than does this monist with whom he is being contrasted. For though Sorley sees individuality in persons, an individuality that things can not claim, he does not break up the unity of reality there-by, because he calls the independence of persons incomplete.¹ His synoptic view, so faithfully maintained, allowed him a vision of the whole.

B) Sorley on the reality of time.

Sorley repudiates the logic that Bosanquet used in denying the reality of time which led him to the belief that we have no conception of time which is absolute or final. The same might be said, comments Sorley, of our conceptions of self, of God, and of the universe; "yet these may be real, even ultimately real."²

4) Reality broader than existence.

Sorley explains why reality is broader than existence. It includes the ideas through which the meaning or purpose of existing things may be discerned.

5) God is Ultimate Reality.

Just as the logic of the impersonalist Bosanquet drove him to the ultimate idea of the Absolute, so the logic of the personalist Sorley forced him to turn to God, the final explanation of the universe. Explaining why the old proofs for theism are now in disfavor, and discussing them at some length, Sorley departs from the traditional approach to the problem, asking not, "Does God exist?" but rather, "How is the universe to be understood and interpreted?"⁴

¹ Sorley MVIG 242; ³ MVIG, 291;

² "Time and Reality", Mind, 32, 148-149;

⁴ Ibid. 301;

Yet Berkeley cannot, because he does not

mean of the unity of reality when he says that it is
he is being understood. For though Berkeley does not
in persons, an individuality that things can not have, he
does not break up the unity of reality thereby, because he
calls the independence of persons independent. His sceptic
view, so tentatively maintained, allowed him a vision of the
whole.

3) Berkeley on the reality of time.

Berkeley maintained the logic that Descartes
used in denying the reality of time which led him to the
belief that we have no conception of time which is absolute
or final. The same might be said, comments Berkeley, of our
conceptions of self, of God, and of the universe; yet these
may be real, even without any reality.

4) Reality broader than existence.

Berkeley explains why reality is broader
than existence. It includes the ideas through which the
meaning or purpose of existing things may be discerned.

5) God is Ultimate Reality.

Just as the logic of the immaterialist
Descartes drove him to the ultimate idea of the Absolute,
so the logic of the immaterialist Berkeley forced him to turn
to God, the final explanation of the universe. Explaining
why the old proofs for God's existence are now in doubt, and dis-
missing them as mere fictions, Berkeley depends upon the tradi-
tional response to the problem, saying not, "Does God exist?"
but rather, "How is the universe to be understood and known?"

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4. "The Logic of the Immaterialist"
5. "The Logic of the Immaterialist"

their attention.

Sorley is more lenient towards spiritual pluralism than towards the materialistic type, because he sees room for values and even for a Supreme Mind in the former.¹ But he perceives that a radical pluralism requires a universe for each self, the logical end being solipsism. He shows how Leibniz avoided this.²

Sorley makes an important distinction: reality is arrived at through the coöperation of minds, but this is not the same as the production of reality. Pluralism has won its case only when this distinction is ignored, or when the apprehension and construction of reality are made one. But both the natural and moral orders existed before their discovery by human minds. Thus pluralism, apart from theism, has no explanation for this "complicated but orderly system". The troubles of pluralism are increased when the objective validity of moral values is granted.³ It is however, the reluctance to admit a Super Mind that is the chief trouble-maker for the pluralists.⁴ It is when Sorley is on the topic of monism that he is in conflict with Bosanquet. Freedom is given up and goodness made nominal by Spinoza, who for Western thought, is the advocate of monism or pantheism. In this theory individuals are rated according to their approach to the Absolute.⁵ But Sorley wants to know why anything that keeps its place should be regarded as having

¹Ibid. 362-363;

²Ibid. 367;

³Sorley, MVIG, 371, 375, 377;

⁴Ibid. 378;

⁵Ibid. 389.

their attention.

Forney is more realistic towards the materialistic type, because he gives room for values and even for a program that in the future. But he perceives that a radical spiritual revolution is necessary for each self, the logical and moral synthesis. He shows how Leibniz avoided this.

Forney makes an important distinction: reality is divided at the very beginning into the cooperation of mind, but this is not the same as the production of reality. Materialism has been the case only when this distinction is ignored, or when the cooperation and interaction of reality and mind are lost. But both the natural and moral orders are before us in discovery by human mind. This divided world from chaos, has no explanation for this "complicated but orderly system". The theories of materialism are founded when the objective validity of moral values is granted. It is however, the reluctance to admit a higher mind that is not only a hindrance for the physicalist. It is when Forney is on the topic of matter that he is in conflict with Rosenzweig. Freedom is given up and goodness made nominal by holocaust, who for Western thought, is the advocate of nihilism or nihilism. In this theory individuals are rated according to their approach to the Absolute. But Forney wants to know any-thing that keeps its place should be regarded as having

1. Ibid. 302-303;
2. Ibid. 307;
3. Ibid. 310, 311, 312, 313;
4. Ibid. 314;
5. Ibid. 315.

contradiction, and why anything absolutely necessary to the whole should be called less real than something else; and he declares that this theory fails in the acid test--the knowledge it gives of the individual or particular.¹ Kant, he says, impressed by the discrepancy between the natural and moral orders postulated a transcendent and powerful God as an agency of reconciliation.² But monism, without^a personal God has no harmonizer of the natural, logical and moral orders. It must surrender at least one of these orders.

Defining God as "the Will to goodness, intellect and power, Final Cause, and Final Home of Values,"⁴ Sorley takes up the championship of the cause of theism, accepting it as the only solution of the riddle of the universe. The whole and all its parts are dependent upon one Supreme Mind.⁵ It is in this way that he finds unity in the universe. He speaks of the universal and natural tendency to designate beauty, truth and goodness as divineⁱⁿ nature, and likeness to that nature to the extent of participation in goodness.⁶ In this view the purpose so apparent in the world is the purpose of God. Finite minds achieve unity with this Supreme Person not by the absorption of their individuality, but by the perfection of their characters in association with that Mind, especially in carrying out divine purposes. Sorley uses the term "Absolute" in the sense that there is nothing independent of God's nature and will, but it is interesting to note that he preferred the term "Perfection" in the designation of God, for this is the term to which Bosanquet had assigned reality, but with no personal content.

¹ Ibid. 388-390;

² Ibid. 392;

³ Thesis, 24;

⁴ Sorley, MVIG, 466, 487;

⁵ Ibid, 307;

⁶ Ibid. 466, 473.

...and any anything absolutely necessary to the
whole should be called into being something else; and
he declares that this theory fails in the cold test--the
knowledge is given of the individual on certain...
be given, impressed by the discrepancy between the material and
moral orders postulated a transcendental and powerful God as
an agency of reconciliation. But neither, without personal
God has no harmonious of the material, logical and moral orders.
It must surrender at least one of these orders.
Defining God as "the Will to goodness, intelligence
and power, final Cause, and final Home of values," Bouvier takes
up the championship of the cause of religion, something to be
the only religion of the middle of the universe. The whole
and all its parts are dependent upon one Supreme Mind. It
is in this way that he finds unity in the universe. He speaks
of the universal and natural tendency to definite beauty,
truth and goodness as divine nature, and likewise to that
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view the universe as a part in the world is the process of God.
Finite minds achieve unity with this Supreme Person not by the
absorption of their individuality, but by the perfection of
their character in association with that mind, especially in
carrying out divine purposes. Bouvier uses the term "participation"
in the sense that there is nothing independent of God's nature
and will, but it is interesting to note that he interpreted the
term "participation" in the designation of God. For this is the
term to which Bouvier has assigned reality, and with no
personal element.

1. 101. 388-390;
2. 101. 391;
3. 101. 392;
4. 101. 393;
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B. Relation of the individual to reality.

1. Part of the whole, for the sake of the whole.

Bosanquet viewed the person as a part of the organic and perfect whole.¹ But by saying that the Absolute needs us,¹ Bosanquet has made man's relationship with reality an ideal rather than an intrinsic one. Man should consider the interests of the whole.

2. Part of the whole for the sake of the individual.

Sorley, on the other hand, views the individual from the standpoint of the individual. The Absolute is not perfect; it needs to be improved.² The adaptation, ~~correspon-~~
~~dence~~ dence, and cooperation among persons are for the good of each.³ Man is an agent, not a victim, in the changing of the world's course.⁴ Nature is a field for the development of human character.⁵

IV. Goal of the Individual.

A. Introduction.

Though they differ upon the nature of the goal, both of our writers agree that there is an objective toward which every person should strive.

B. Particular examination of the problem.

Is the goal:

1. Life, that is, adaptation to environment or self-preservation?

It is Sorley who brings up, and disposes of, this view. Recognizing that life, though variously termed,

¹Thesis, 29.
²Sorley, EN, 133, 136;
³Ibid. 223-224;

⁴MVIG, 25;
⁵EN, 133.

1. The subject of the individual is hereby.

2. Part of the whole, for the sake of the whole.

3. The subject of the individual is hereby.

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is the goal held by some evolutionists for all beings, Sorley describes the effect of applying the theory of evolution to ethics, having the example of Spencer in mind.¹ Spencer had argued that race-preservation and self-preservation evolved together, and that therefore egoistic and altruistic trends become harmonized, while the moral life assumes the nature of a "moving equilibrium approaching completeness."² Sorley objects to this view, pointing out that individual and social welfare are sometimes in both seeming and real opposition, that on this view man is governed from without, and that an equilibrium which is motionless is at variance with Spencer's concept of the increase of life through evolution, and that harmony with environment may come through another method,--a method recognized by evolution,--the subordination of circumstances to the self.²

Sorley concludes that only conflicting results come from applying the theory of evolution to ethics,³ that the theory gives no satisfactory goal of conduct, either independently or in cooperation with hedonism,³ and that life (adaptation to environment, or self-preservation) is not the goal of human endeavor.

2. Happiness?

Consciously or unconsciously, Bosanquet and Sorley join forces against hedonism.

b. Bosanquet denied it.

Though believing that hedonism was on the gain among idealists,⁴ Bosanquet rejected it for the following reasons:

1) Perfect happiness not the ideal of

¹ Sorley, EN, 247;

² Ibid. EN, 248, 251, 258; ³ Ibid, 272, 273, 283, 303, 304, 308-309.

⁴ Bosanquet, "Hedonism among Idealists," Mind, 12, 202.

perfection. This would mean, said Bosanquet that the misery of the lost in Hell, would contribute to the joy of the saved in Heaven, that is if these are true conceptions.¹

2) The ideal, happiness, withdraws attention from the Absolute, and present values. This is a serious offense, for to Bosanquet the Absolute, not happiness, spells perfection; and pain has a place in the Absolute.²

3) We demand not pleasure but satisfaction.

This reason is linked with the one above, for satisfaction, according to Bosanquet, is attained only by absorption into the Absolute.³

4) It is mistake to lay down in advance any object of satisfaction. That is like binding a physicist, he said, before he begins his science to the terms in which he is to explain phenomena.⁴

5) It is an inconsistency to make feeling the criterion of the goal. We ascribe moral reasonableness to purposes of action; this, he inferred, is not in harmony with regarding feeling as the criterion of the goal.⁵

6) Pleasure is not the good, but a good. "We see that pleasure is only one thing among others that are good."⁶

7) The universe can not be regarded as a place

¹Bosanquet, PIV, 18;

²Ibid. 19;

³Ibid. 244; SP, 215, 201;

⁴SP, 215-216;

⁵"Will and Reason", Monist, 2, 27;

⁶SE, 50.

between. This would mean, said Boonin, that the
 misery of the job is hell. would contribute to the joy
 of the saved in Heaven, that is all those who are saved.
 2) The issue, happiness, withdrawal attention
 from the Absolute, and personal values. This is a serious
 illness. For to understand the Absolute, not happiness, really
 perfect and pain has a place in the Absolute.
 3) We demand not pleasure but satisfaction.
 This reason is linked with the one above, for
 satisfaction, according to Boonin, is not only by
 absorption into the Absolute.
 4) It is always to lay down in advance any
 object of satisfaction. This is like studying a physical
 he said, before he begins his science to the terms in which
 he is to explain phenomena.
 5) It is an inconsistency to make feeling the
 criterion of the good. We ascribe moral responsibility to
 persons of action; this, he insisted, is not in harmony
 with regarding feeling as the criterion of the good.
 6) Pleasure is not the good, not a good, "we
 see that pleasure is only one thing among others that are good."
 7) The universe can not be regarded as a place

Boonin, p. 18;
 Field, 19;
 Field, 24; 25, 213, 201;
 27, 213-216;
 "Will and Reason", Journal, 2, 27;
 23, 20.

of pleasure.¹ This is consistent with his belief that this world is a "vale of soul-making", and that hazards and hardships are essential features of reality and inescapable by finite beings.

b. Sorley also denies it.

Is pleasure or the more general conception, happiness, the goal of life? "No", answers Sorley, and for several reasons:

1) The notion is too general. Pleasure attaches itself to values of every kind, instead of itself being one kind over against the others.²

But, even were it still the case, as it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly all men were agreed as to the name of the highest good, and that the common people and the cultured alike called it happiness, the difference as to what they meant by the term would still remain.³

2) Pleasure is not the good; only some pleasures are good.⁴

3) The standards of both hedonism and utilitarianism are impracticable. Pleasure can not be measured.⁵ These systems stand by, unable to give suggestions on the means of the improvement of the human mind.⁶

4) Happiness is limited. When dependent on external conditions, it shares the limitation suffered by knowledge and by aesthetic values, while moral

¹Bosanquet, PIV, XVIII.

²Sorley, MVIG, 30

³EN, 7; see also 218 & MVIG, 28;

⁴MVIG, 29;

⁵Ibid, 30;

⁶EN, 67.

values are not limited in the same way.¹

5) The utilitarians are inconsistent. In his review of "The English Utilitarians", Sorley gives a comprehensive view of the inconsistencies of this group.²

6) Pleasure in actual experience can not be set always over against pain. While pain is connected with hindrances, pleasure comes in their removal. The desire for life modifies conditions so that pleasure may follow from almost any course of conduct.³

7) It is impossible to determine the greatest producers of pleasure. The possibility of "the modification of function and feeling in the evolution of life" makes it impossible to say, declares Sorley, what will produce the greatest amount of pleasure.⁴

8) Hedonism based on the theory of evolution argues in a circle.

Pleasure as the end is seen to be only definable as life or activity, although it was adopted as the end in order that by its help we might discover what life or activity meant as the end for conduct.⁵

9) The dignity of man is not upheld by adopting this goal.

¹Sorley, MVIG, 50.

²Sorley, Rev. of "The English Utilitarians", by Leslie Stephens, *Mind*, 10, 533; See also EN, 44-45, 32, 47, 51, 70, 77

³and HEP, 251;

⁴EN, 239-240;

⁵Ibid. 240-241 with 35;

⁵Ibid. 241; see also 73.

If pleasure is the only end, and satisfaction is simply another name for it, then it is plainly incorrect to say that 'it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied'.¹

10) The world-order is not a moral order if creation is viewed as providing maximum happiness for conscious beings.²

11) Hedonism is contrary to theism.³

3. Absorption into the Absolute?

A. Bosanquet.

It is the conviction of Bosanquet that this is the goal. Under the influence of Bradley, and reacting against Berkeley, Bosanquet turned from the self to the Absolute, the organic whole of selves. Berkeley, regarding minds as the one reality had failed to organize them. This, Hegel had done by bringing individuals into the Absolute. This conception was mediated by way of Bradley to Bosanquet.

1) Nature of the Absolute.

That the Absolute is not a person has already been made clear.⁴ It is not to be confused with the idea of God, which some philosophers use, for Bosanquet calls attention to the omission made by Pringle-Pattison of a distinction between God and the Absolute.⁵

The Absolute is limited, and characterized by

¹ Sorley, EN, 206;

² Ibid. 344;

³ Ibid.

⁴ Thesis, 29.

⁵ Bosanquet, Rev. of "The Idea of God by Pringle-Pattison, Mind, 26, 478-479.

⁵ See also ,Bradley, F.H. Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914, 428.

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If pleasure is not only good, and
satisfaction is always another name for it,
then it is pleasure to say that
it is better to be a human being dis-
satisfied than a dog satisfied; better to
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satis-
fied.

10) The world-order is not a moral order.

Attention is drawn to providing various responses for
conscience beings.

11) Hedonism is contrary to religion.

1. Absorption into the Absolute

A. Hedonism.

It is the conviction of Hedonism that this

is the goal. Under the influence of Hedonism, and the rise

against Hedonism, movements started from the call to the

Absolute, the spiritual whole of release, morality, religious

faith as the one reality had failed to organize them. This

Hegel had done by bringing individuals into the Absolute.

This conception was carried by way of leading to Hedonism.

1) Nature of the Absolute.

That the Absolute is not a person has already

been made clear. It is not to be confused with the idea of

God, which some philosophers use, for Hedonism calls atten-

tion to the existence made by finite-Existence of a distinction

between God and the Absolute.

The Absolute is limited, and characterized by

1) Hedonism, 2) Hedonism, 3) Hedonism, 4) Hedonism, 5) Hedonism, 6) Hedonism, 7) Hedonism, 8) Hedonism, 9) Hedonism, 10) Hedonism, 11) Hedonism, 12) Hedonism, 13) Hedonism, 14) Hedonism, 15) Hedonism, 16) Hedonism, 17) Hedonism, 18) Hedonism, 19) Hedonism, 20) Hedonism, 21) Hedonism, 22) Hedonism, 23) Hedonism, 24) Hedonism, 25) Hedonism, 26) Hedonism, 27) Hedonism, 28) Hedonism, 29) Hedonism, 30) Hedonism, 31) Hedonism, 32) Hedonism, 33) Hedonism, 34) Hedonism, 35) Hedonism, 36) Hedonism, 37) Hedonism, 38) Hedonism, 39) Hedonism, 40) Hedonism, 41) Hedonism, 42) Hedonism, 43) Hedonism, 44) Hedonism, 45) Hedonism, 46) Hedonism, 47) Hedonism, 48) Hedonism, 49) Hedonism, 50) Hedonism, 51) Hedonism, 52) Hedonism, 53) Hedonism, 54) Hedonism, 55) Hedonism, 56) Hedonism, 57) Hedonism, 58) Hedonism, 59) Hedonism, 60) Hedonism, 61) Hedonism, 62) Hedonism, 63) Hedonism, 64) Hedonism, 65) Hedonism, 66) Hedonism, 67) Hedonism, 68) Hedonism, 69) Hedonism, 70) Hedonism, 71) Hedonism, 72) Hedonism, 73) Hedonism, 74) Hedonism, 75) Hedonism, 76) Hedonism, 77) Hedonism, 78) Hedonism, 79) Hedonism, 80) Hedonism, 81) Hedonism, 82) Hedonism, 83) Hedonism, 84) Hedonism, 85) Hedonism, 86) Hedonism, 87) Hedonism, 88) Hedonism, 89) Hedonism, 90) Hedonism, 91) Hedonism, 92) Hedonism, 93) Hedonism, 94) Hedonism, 95) Hedonism, 96) Hedonism, 97) Hedonism, 98) Hedonism, 99) Hedonism, 100) Hedonism.

negativity which does not disappear when contradiction is removed from individuals, but remains a real characteristic of the whole.¹ Then Bosanquet states and restates that the Absolute contains time.²

2) Transmutation of persons and Nature.

Into this Absolute, finite individuals are absorbed. Expanded to the maximum of their personality, they are "transmuted" into the whole.³ The beginning of the process is to cease thinking of ourselves as separate beings.⁴ We do not possess substantive being, but only adjectival being.⁵ Into this Absolute also, as related to finite mind, Bosanquet puts nature.⁶ Thus it contains all experience.

b. Sorley.

Sorley rejects this goal put forward by Bosanquet for two reasons:

1) Meaningless, in some respects.

First, infinite to finite....Then finite back to infinite,...Does not the whole process in which the finite is pushed out into apparent reality only that it may get pushed back again-seem meaningless? It would not be meaningless if the finite brought back to its source a value gained from its adventure in time; but this would be to enrich the infinite-a palpable contradiction.⁷

¹Picard, Maurice, in Rev. of Bosanquet's SP, Jour.Phil., 25 468.

²Bosanquet, SP, 115, 118, 122, 224; MECP. 153;

³PIV, 373;

⁴Ibid. XXXI;

⁵LFI, 75-76;

⁶PIV, 371;

⁷Sorley, "Time and Reality", Mind, 158.

negativity which does not disappear when contradiction is removed from individuals, but remains a real characteristic of the whole. When Rosenberg states and repeats that the Absolute contains time.

2) Transmutation of nervous and psychic.

Into this Absolute, finite individuals are

absorbed. Known to the maximum of their personality.

They are "transmuted" into the whole. The beginning of the

process is to cease thinking of ourselves as separate beings.

We do not possess a separate being, but only relative being.

Into this Absolute which is related to finite mind, Rosenberg

puts nature. It is in contact with existence.

3. Society.

Rosenberg rejects this point put forward by Rosenberg

for two reasons:

1) Meaningless, in social terms.

First, infinite in time.... Then
finite back to infinite.... Does not
any whole process in which the finite
is washed out? Also important reality
only that it may get washed back
again into meaninglessness? It would not
be meaningless if the finite brought
back to the source a value gained from
its existence in time; but this would be
to admit the finite's relative con-
struction.

Second, contrary to Rev. of Rosenberg's 21, Jan. Feb., 23

2) Rosenberg, 21, 115, 116, 122, 224, 225, 123;

21, 22;

115, 122;

21, 22-23;

21, 22;

21, 22, "Time and Reality", 115, 122.

2) Irrational in other respects.

Sorley is not in favor of the unreasonable conception of absorption into the Absolute being put as a goal before men. According to this theory what the favored few attain in this life - unity with the Infinite, the wicked as well as the righteous attain in the end. Then the experience of the mystics to which Bosanquet appealed is exceptional; their interpretation of their experience may not be sound. There is not the distinction between man and God that is required to substantiate this appeal to religious experience.

For most men the religious experience not only starts with the finite individual; but also finds the individual 'born again' by union with the Infinite. Without the distinction between God and man it is as impossible to interpret the religious life as it is to interpret it apart from their union. The believer does not trust in himself....¹

Bosanquet receives no confirmation for his theory from the experience of the philosophers, declares Sorley, for they do not become God as the mystic is said to become; "they only seek to describe the infinite whole", into which the mystic is supposed to have been lost.¹

Then it was partly the ambiguity in the term "Absolute" that caused Sorley to choose instead the term "Perfection", for the former term can be too easily identified with the term "God".²

Having thrown out the notion of absorption into the Absolute, what goal will Sorley substitute?

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 157;
² Ibid. 495.

...transformation in their response.
...is not in favor of the transformation
...of absorption into the Absolute being
...as a goal before men. According to this theory what the
...lowest law states in this life - unity with the Infinite,
...the stated as well as the righteous state in the end.
...than the experience of the mystic to which Rosenkrantz
...appealed is exceptional; their interpretation of their
...experience may not be sound. There is not the distinction
...between man and God that is required to understand this
...appeal to religious experience.

For what are the religious experiences
...not only shared with the finite individual,
...but also found in the individual? Rosenkrantz
...states that the Infinite, which is the Absolute,
...is not a person and man is not a person. It is
...to understand the religious life as it is
...interest is not in their union. The
...believer does not trust in himself....

Rosenkrantz receives no contradiction from his
...theory from the experience of the religious mystics,
...God, for they do not believe God as the Infinite is said to
...because "they only seek to describe the Infinite state"
...into which the mystic is supposed to have been lost.
...There is not really the mystery in the term
..."Absolute" and Rosenkrantz is not aware of the fact
..."Infinite", for the latter term can be well
...identified with the term "God".
...Having shown that the notion of absorption
...into the Absolute, that God will surely be satisfied

1. Rosenkrantz, op. cit. 187.
2. Ibid. 187.

4. Goodness?

a. Bosanquet answered "No".

Goodness,...cannot be the moral end. If we make it so, it loses its content and collapses into nothingness. The world that conditions our goodness must not exist merely for our goodness sake, but must subordinate it to some concrete need or nature.¹

b. Sorley answers, "Yes".

He advances several reasons for his affirmative answer.

1) Goodness is a definable and appropriate goal; he admits that it can not be pointed out as a tangible object can be, but it is indefinable only in that sense.² He considers it an appropriate goal for two reasons:³ The idea of goodness is valid for the universal order, and it harmonizes with the nature of man.

2) A theistic and authoritative goal. The end is not absorption into the Absolute but rather partnership with a personal infinite Being. More specifically, the goal is perfection of character through such cooperation.⁴ This personal God has "charged" the world of persons with the discovery and realization of values. This goal of goodness is then also authoritative.

¹ Bosanquet, PIV, 26;
² Sorley, SE, 51;
³ MVIG, 485, 496; EN, 4;
⁴ Thesis, 35.

The notion of 'ought'...implies an obligation to pursue a definite end or conform to definite rules regarded generally as coming from an authoritative source.¹

Thus the purpose in the world is the purpose of a Supreme Mind.²

3) A freely-chosen goal.

Though it is an authoritative goal, it is also, finally, a freely-chosen goal. It can be rejected. This accounts for the liability of failure. In Bosanquet's conception, there was no "talking back" to the process; every individual "must work out its nisus to the whole".³ but in Sorley's view, while there is a sense of obligation coming from the recognition on the part of the individual of a Supreme mind, there is the sense of freedom that is allied with the dignity of moral beings. Goodness is open to the choice of every person.

Thus, these two writers have given us their conceptions of the nature of personal life. Exposition rather than criticism has been the aim in the comparison and contrast upon the various points.

¹Sorley, EN, 8;
²MVIG, 474, 485.
³Thesis, 24.

The notion of 'nobility'... involves an obligation to maintain a certain standard of conduct in relation to the rights of others. It is a quality of mind which is not confined to the noblest of men, but is a quality of mind which is common to all men.

There are persons in the world in the world.

one of a noble mind.

3) A truly-noble mind.

There is an individual who is

also, himself, a truly-noble mind. It can be judged.

This account for the nobility of feeling. In Rousseau's

conception, there was a "nobility" in the nobility of

individuals "was not the nobility of the whole." It is

not a nobility of feeling, but a nobility of feeling.

From the recognition on the part of the individual of a

noble mind, there is the sense of nobility that is called

with the dignity of noble feeling. Nobility is not the

choice of every person.

There, there are persons who give us nobility.

conceptions of the nature of personal life. Nobility

rather than nobility was the aim in the conception

and contrast with the various nobles.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE DESTINY OF PERSONAL LIFE

I. Is there Perpetuation of Personal Life?

Where shall we look for an answer?

A. In the realm of moral values?

1. Bosanquet.

In the field of ethics, Bosanquet found no answer to the question of future existence. Upon this point he maintained the attitude he took concerning the light that ethics throws upon the nature of personal life. He discovered in the realm of moral values no solution to the problem of personal existence because of his indifference towards any arguments upon this subject that might be drawn from ethics. He granted that it was natural to believe in conscious future existence. This belief is voiced in poetry,¹ and in philosophy. The ghost of the two-world theory is continually rising from the dead "to haunt the common-sense thinker."² The "old convictions" of compensation found in the Bible were well known to the Greeks and to many other nations.³ Meliorism is found in several present day philosophies.⁴ The question, "Does the conservation of value imply the conservation of personality- or this or that personality or of any?", raised by Mr. Tsanoff did not provoke any direct answer from Bosanquet, who while admitting the inexhaustibleness of values, manifested his

¹Bosanquet, SP, 102;

²"Discussion", Phil.Rev., 28, 336;

³SP, 336;

⁴MECP, 120-121.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORY OF PERSONAL LIFE

1. In these chapters of personal life

where shall we look for an answer?

A. In the realm of moral values

I. Response.

In the realm of values, answered found no

answer to the question of future existence. Upon this point

he maintained the evidence is too convincing the life that

exists upon the basis of personal life. He discovered

in the realm of moral values no solution to the problem of

personal existence because of the indifference towards any

arguments upon this subject that might be drawn from ethics.

He expressed that it was natural to believe in existence

future existence. This belief is rooted in poetry, and in

philosophy. The ghost of the two-world theory is continually

rising from the dead to haunt the common-sense thinker. The

"old convictions" of conventionalism found in the Bible were well

known to the Greeks and to many other nations. Multitudes in

land in several present day philosophies. The question, "Does

the conservation of value imply the conservation of personality?

or this or that personality at all?" raised by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller

did not produce any direct answer from philosophers, who were

admitting the indifference of values, maintained his

philosophy, pp. 101;
"Philosophy", Phil. Rev., pp. 330;
pp. 101;
pp. 100-101.

indifference towards, and impatience with, any applications which might be derived from the conservation of values.¹ This indifference is expressed in another connection.

The principal thing that matters is the level and fulness of mind attained. The destiny and separate conservation of particular minds is of inferior importance and merely instrumental to the former.²

Bosanquet went beyond the point of indifference, however, for he denied the logic of deducing the conclusion of immortality from any premise of the conservation of value.

To identify the conservation of values with the permanence or survival of given personalities, as Professor Varisco appears to do, is to my mind an extraordinary assumption.¹

2. Sorley.

Sorley, on the other hand, to be consistent, is expected to answer that a solution to the problem of the perpetuation of personality is to be found in the realm of moral values. This expectation is verified for he binds up the conservation of value with the conservation of personality; only persons are bearers of value.² For values to persevere, then, persons must persevere. He argued for the conservation of value³ appealing to the law of compensation in nature (for instance, the conservation of value even when institutions and beliefs connected with them perished) and to the objectivity of value, contending that a universe "which upholds and contains these objectively valid values" will not allow them

¹Bosanquet, "Notes", Phil.Rev., 30, 216;

²PIV, 20;

³Ibid.

independence of values, and resistance with, not dependence
which might be derived from the consideration of values. This
independence is expressed in another connection.

The principle being that matter is the level
and fineness of mind attained. The degree and
respective consideration of particular things is
of interest, importance and mainly instrumental to
the former.

However, for the matter the point of independence
of independence from any exercise of the consideration of values.
However, for the matter the logic of deduction the non-independence

To identify the consideration of values
with the occurrence or survival of given
personality, as Professor Weyl has shown
to do, is to say that an extraordinary person
person.

F. Sorley.

Sorley, on the other hand, to be consistent, is
expected to answer that a solution to the problem of the
perpetuation of personality is to be found in the realm of
moral values. This expectation is verified for he binds up
the consideration of value with the consideration of personality;
only persons are centers of value. For values to persist,
then, persons must survive. He argues for the consideration
of value, pointing to the fact of organization in nature
instances, the consideration of value even when independent
and beliefs connected with that part; and to the object-
ivity of value, concluding that a universe which holds the
conclusion that objectively values exist will not allow them

to perish, but rather will "provide some means for their permanent realisation."¹ He explains the relationship existing between the survival of persons and of personal values. Are values to be lost? They will be lost, if free minds cease to exist, or become absorbed in God. If either of these tragedies occurs, the question that forces itself upon us is, are the values which men throughout history have fought and died to preserve, worth the sacrifice? ²

B. In the realm of religious values?

1. Bosanquet did not go where he usually went for an answer.

Naturally, we expect to find Bosanquet true to his characteristic emphasis upon religion. Instead, he denied that the survival of living beings had any special religious interest in it,⁵ and condemned traditional religion for its separation of man from the lower animals in its discussion of the destiny of man.⁶

2. Sorley finds a solution in this field.

On the other hand, Sorley with his emphasis upon moral values, makes a statement, which though general, has an important bearing upon this problem: "So far as the individual problem gets a solution at all, it is usually through the religious faith of the individual person."⁷ He calls attention to the view held by Höfding that the permanent and essential element in religion is a faith in the conservation of value.

¹Bosanquet PVI, 21, footnote.

²Sorley MVIG, 172-175;

³Ibid. 175;

⁴Ibid. 526;

⁵Bosanquet SP, 23;

⁶SSE, 79, with, 73-75.

⁷Sorley, MVIG, 514.

to period, but rather with "provisional" or "relative" values. It is not the values themselves which are relative, but the standards by which they are judged. The values themselves are absolute, but the standards by which they are judged are relative. This is the position that I take. It is not the values themselves which are relative, but the standards by which they are judged. This is the position that I take. It is not the values themselves which are relative, but the standards by which they are judged. This is the position that I take.

8. In the realm of religious values
 1. Bosanquet did not do what he usually did
 for an answer.
 Naturally, we expect to find Bosanquet true to his characteristic emphasis upon religion. Indeed, in his mind that the survival of living beings was not a religious interest in itself, but a conditioned traditional religion for the separation of man from the lower animals in the discussion of the history of man.²

2. Gortler finds a solution in this field.
 On the other hand, Gortler with his emphasis upon moral values, takes a statement, which though general, has an important bearing upon this problem: "So far as the individual chooses good a solution as well, it is usually through the religious faith of the individual person."³ He calls attention to the view held by Helling that the permanent and essential element in religion is a faith in the conservation of values.

¹ Bosanquet, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 100.
² Bosanquet, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 100.
³ Gortler, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 100.
⁴ Bosanquet, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 100.

Sorley thinks that it should be called a postulate rather than an axiom. Yet this does not weaken this appeal to religion for proof of the conservation of value through the continuance of persons alone, because the conservation of energy, likewise regarded as an "anticipation of experience," is also a postulate.¹

C. In the realm of philosophy?

1. Bosanquet's negative answer.

Philosophy gives no warrant for the assumption of a future life based upon the existence of two worlds; this is the thesis of Bosanquet in his review and translation of "The Philosophy of Fine Arts" by Hegel. The latter taught that "the two worlds" are inseparable, all men living in some degree in both.

The 'things not seen', philosophically speaking are no world of existences or of intelligences co-ordinate with and severed from this present world.²

The spiritual world is the present world, said Bosanquet, pointing to the false antithesis between mental and physical vision; the "seeing eye is always the mind's eye". He concludes that the distinction between sense and spirit is within the mind.³ Bosanquet remarks upon the absence of the obscure "beyond" in Hegel's system, and the feeling that he gives the reader that he is dealing with the real, "the deepest concerns of life". Bosanquet believes that no really great philosophical or religious teacher can be understood unless we grasp the distinction between the two worlds as a distinction between aspects only of the present and known world. Some of

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 160;

² Bosanquet, PFA, XXIII, SP, 325;

³ Ibid. XXII-XXIII, SP, 324.

...is also a possibility...

...in the realm of philosophy...

...the things of the world...

...the spiritual world is the present world...

these teachers, he granted, indulging their imaginations, did separate the present and known world from the future unknown world, but he thought that their purpose was to bring the other world within our reach.¹ Bosanquet denied that the conception of persons living through endless ages, persons whom we shall meet in the future, was a philosophical conception.

Such a world, whatever we may think about its actual existence, is not the 'other world' of philosophy. The things not seen' of Plato or of Hegel are never a double or a projection of the existing world. Plato indeed wavered between the two conceptions.... But in Hegel there is no ambiguity. The world of spirits with him is no world of ghosts.²

Does philosophy give hope as well as guidance? Bosanquet believed not, considering the very essence of Hegelian thought to be that philosophy has nothing to do with the "barren forms of thought that are always in a world beyond", its object being something concrete and present.³

And thus an opinion supported by thinkers for whom I have a profound respect A.E. Taylor, in particular seems to me untenable, the doctrine that is, that philosophy gives hope not guidance.⁴

The result was that Bosanquet found no solution to the problem of immortality in the realms of ethics, religion and philosophy.

¹ Bosanquet, SP, 322;

² Bosanquet, PFA, XVII; SP, 321; See "Discussion", Phil, Rev., 28, 290.

³ PFA, SV; SP, 320 from Hegel's Logic (Wallace tr.), 150;

⁴ PIV, 19.

2. Sorley's affirmation.

Not only did Sorley place confidence in the testimony of moral values respecting the future; he also looked to philosophy for hope concerning the future as well as guidance for the present. Sabin in a review of Sorley's chief work, notes that the author conceived the business of philosophy to be the achieving^{of} what Sabin chose to call "the grand view", namely the view that the moral order is an eternal order.¹ Thus Sorley gets hope as well as guidance from philosophy, because to him an eternal moral order spells the preserving of moral values, which in turn implies the perpetuation of persons as the preservers of values. Thus, Sorley finds assurance for personal future conscious existence in the fields of ethics, religion and philosophy.

11. How shall Eternal Life be described?

A. Extension into another world, or mere completeness in this world?

1. Mere completeness, the decision of Bosanquet.

We are spirits, and our life is one with that of the Spirit which is the whole and the good. Then, surely, we are external.²

This appears to be an affirmation of the extension of personality beyond the bounds of this life. But evidently he had only present self-completeness in mind, for while he granted that it was natural to cling to the idea of extension, and natural to connect the reality of values with the "persistence of particular souls",³ he did not see how the idea could be defended.

¹ Sabin, Ethel E, Rev. MVIC, Jour. Phil., 16, 609-614.
² Bosanquet, WRI, 25; ³ LFI, 90.

Our being and our destiny are still though thought of in terms of linear progression; and the inherent demand for self completion is construed as a desire to 'go on' and continue our achievement in propria persona. ...If we do not 'go on' in person so it is implied, our values lose their reality... I do not see how it is possible to maintain any attitude even remotely resembling that!

Clearing up what he considered a misconception regarding infinity, Bosanquet described the desire for the extension of personal life as "a sickly yearning" to escape from the real, which as the true infinity is concrete, present and valuable.² Here he claimed to follow Hegel who he said, used the term "infinity" to picture what is most real and most precious in life, self-completeness or satisfaction rather than endlessness. He denied that the concept of endlessness is a part of the concept of completeness of personality.

The student or statesman who longs for continuance in which he may 'complete his work'-some task in the universe analogous to his function on earth, is thinking mainly of those high values of which great individuals are the vehicle. One dares not say that he is wrong; but the consideration of the vast masses of humanity suggests supplementary ideas.³

Perfection is found in the present eternal and absolute order instead of in any future order.⁴

2. Extension as well as completeness, the belief of Sorley.

Basing his claim largely upon the essential relation existing between values and persons, Sorley is convinced that there must be a future life in the sense of both completeness and extension.

¹ Bosanquet, SP, 327: PFA, XXIV:
² Bosanquet, SP, 102.

³ SSE, 84;

⁴ Albee, Ernest, Rev. of VDI Phil Rev., 22, 657, on 308-309

Our being and our feeling are both
thought of in terms of linear progression;
and the inherent demand for self-assertion
is manifested as a desire to 'go on', and
sometimes our development is purely personal.
... If we do not 'go on', in fact, we do not
live, our values lose their reality.
I do not see how it is possible to realize
any attitude even passively without this!

Of course we must be conscious of this.

As regarding infinity, we must be conscious of the desire for the
extension of personal life as "a slowly passing" or "a slow
flow into the past, which is the true infinity is constant, present
and permanent." There is a desire to follow this and be able to
use the term "infinity" to describe what is going on and
what is going on in life. Self-consciousness or self-assertion
rather than selflessness. It is the fact that the concept of self-
lessness is a part of the concept of consciousness of person-
ality.

The student or student who is
for consciousness in which he may 'become'
his work - some form in the universe and
to his location on earth, is seeking reality
of those high values of which great individuals
are the vehicle. The desire not to be
is wrong; but the consciousness of the vast
nature of humanity suggests a deeper
vision.

Personality is found in the concept of unity.

and absolute order inherent in its nature.

3. Extension as well as consciousness, and

order of being.

Having this claim largely from the spiritual

relation existing between values and persons. Unity is

conceived that there must be a future life in the sense of

both consciousness and extension.

For what purpose the infinite pain and effort of individuals if their free consciousness must be relinquished, perhaps just when it has proved itself worthy of freedom?... And if free minds when perfected, are to pass away, even for absorption in God, then that value is lost; and we must ask again the question, with less confidence in the answer, whether the values which the world's history offers are worth the price that has been paid for them.

B. Conscious future existence or continuity of values of the race or of individual influence?

Bosanquet objected to any interpretation of Green that would make it appear that Green taught that the finite self is eternal. He did admit that Green at times taught "something like continuance of personality after death, but denied that it was on the basis of an "eternal finite self." Bosanquet criticizes Taylor for his interpretation of "Eternal Self" a phrase used by Green as an ultimate, underived, finite individual, Bosanquet understood it to mean instead the divine mind or world-consciousness.²

And it is very noticeable that the true or real identity of the self is not, for Green, present prima facie in the intermittent consciousness of man.³

Asking, "What destiny can we consistently desire, Bosanquet answers the question, by saying that no one will much object to an identification of the self with the things he cares for.⁴ He believes that a man will be contented to know that his "main interests" will be safeguarded. For this conscious future existence is not necessary; the continuity of the race would conserve these values. Naturally, too, the immortality of individual influence would depend upon the continuity of the race. This Bosanquet substitutes also for the immortality of the

² Sorley, MVIG? 525;

Bosanquet, SP, 155 on Green's Works, 1, 115; ³ Ibid. 157;

⁴ VDI, 260.

individual himself.

Nearly all mankind rest in unvisited tombs, and leave behind them a common undistinguished work, and it is the value of the general life that we have been trying to appreciate and aspiring to share.¹

As will be brought out in an indirect way in the discussion of Eternal Progress, Sorley believed in the conscious future of the individual.²

C. Future compensation?

Meliorism, reliance on the future to complete or compensate for the past, Bosanquet found to be held in common by neo-idealism, neo-realism pragmatism, instrumentalism and a certain type of religion, in which systems the progress of the race is the fundamental feature, and the good is in the future, to be won by struggle and by "prolonged and collective endeavor". From the religious side are "the old convictions about heaven and the kingdom of God, the invisible world where wrongs will be righted" and man will be "compensated for their good and evil deeds".³

All these ideas-compensation, rewards and punishments, God's commands in the Bible the authority of the clergy-are connected together. They are all fancies that men have had, just as though they were children, and being children knew that they must be treated as children. Children do things because they are told....⁴

He thought that these "fancies" did not occupy a large place in the New Testament. He admitted their power for good in some respects, as in the elevation of man's conception of himself and the value of his soul, but at the same time he lamented their evil effects.

¹ Bosanquet, SSE, 87;
² Thesis, 55

³ Bosanquet, MECP, 120-121; SP, 336;
⁴ SP, 338.

But it has made them careless of the world in which they live, and has narrowed their notions of duty and manliness. Life must not be split up into a present of endurance, and a future of enjoyment.¹

Bosanquet was pleased to read in the New Testament that the Apostle Paul was ready to relinquish his reward in order to save souls. He told the story of the young man who was afraid to go to the rescue of people in a flood, lest he go to Hell in case he lost his life, and to whom an old man shouted, "Better be damned doing the will of God than saved doing nothing".²

Sorley seems to have written nothing upon the future life viewed as a state of compensation.

D. Eternal progress?

1. Bosanquet.

In spite of his advocacy of a perfect world and his antagonism to progress towards perfection, Bosanquet made an admission, which however is not very clear or emphatic.

The progress, being rooted in the ultimate conception of reality as becoming, is conceived as necessarily unending, but it is not admitted ...to merit the disparaging addition of progress ad infinitum.³

Just what the distinction between progress unending and progress ad infinitum, it is difficult to see. Perhaps he thought that the former adjective harmonized better with his conception of the Absolute, to which he is not reluctant to concede eternal life, if that life be in this world rather than in another.⁴

¹Bosanquet, SP, 334;
²Bosanquet, SP, 335;

³MECP, 119;
⁴Thesis, 51.

But it has been the business of the
world to keep him alive, and has maintained
that business of duty and maintenance. Life
must not be left as a present of an-
happiness, and a future of enjoyment.

But he was never to rise in the New Testament.
And that the Apostle Paul was ready to relinquish his power
in order to save souls. He told the story of the vision and
who was afraid to go to the tomb of Jesus in a field. And
he goes to Hell in case he lost his life, and so when an old man
suddenly "blessed" he seemed doing the will of God then saved
being nothing."

So many cases to have written nothing upon the

Person's life viewed as a whole of communication.

D. Ernest Gossamer

I. Gossamer.

In order of his advocacy of a perfect world and
his enthusiasm to progress towards perfection, Gossamer made
an admission, which however is not very clear or explicit.

The progress, being noted in the
highest condition of reality as reality.
is connected as necessarily understood, but it
is not about it... the world's development
isolation of progress as isolation.

Just what the distinction between progress

isolation and progress as isolation, it is difficult to see.
Because he shows that the former subjective harmonized system
with his conception of the Absolute, so which as it is related
back to concrete eternal life, it that life be in this world.
Further than to another."

1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 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3720, 3721, 3722, 3723, 3724, 3725, 3726, 3727, 3728, 3729, 3730, 3731, 3732, 3733, 3734, 3735, 3736, 3737, 3738, 3739, 3740, 3741, 3742, 3743, 3744, 3745, 3746, 3747, 3748, 3749, 3750, 3751, 3752, 3753, 3754, 3755, 3756, 3757, 3758, 3759, 3760, 3761, 3762, 3763, 3764, 3765, 3766, 3767, 3768, 3769, 3770, 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 3778, 3779, 3780, 3781, 3782, 3783, 3784, 3785, 3786, 3787, 3788, 3789, 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3797, 3798, 3799, 3800, 3801, 3802, 3803, 3804, 3805, 3806, 3807, 3808, 3809, 3810, 3811, 3812, 3813, 3814, 3815, 3816, 3817, 3818, 3819, 3820, 3821, 3822, 3823, 3824, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3828, 3829, 3830, 3831, 3832, 3833, 3834, 3835, 3836, 3837, 3838, 3839, 3840, 3841, 3842, 3843, 384

2. Sorley.

Sorley also held, although more clearly and consistently, that progress is unending. After goodness has been achieved, after moral perfection has been won, that is, after harmony has come between will and ideal (a perfection he held to be possible in this world), adventure will not cease, progress will not stop. This is because the mastery of evil is only one phase, the negative phase, of perfection. Enterprise and achievement will go on after victory has been won over sin, even after the victory over death. There is infinite progress because there is no place to stop, either in time or in eternity. We must press on into "the Unknown" to make all things subservient to the values we must realize. According to our capacity, we shall be fitted for nobler service.

But if free minds endure, it must be for a range of activity suited to the capacities and values which they have acquired in their mundane experience. And if here or elsewhere they attain that complete harmony between will and ideal in which perfection consists, they will be fitted thereby for nobler enterprise.¹

¹Sorley, MVIG, 526.

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL CRITIQUE OF BOSANQUET AND SORLEY

I. Sorley.

A. Criticism of Sorley's Conception of man.

Among the very few critics of the work of Sorley that were found, Inge was the severest.¹ He objected to the idea of the individual as the home of values; Sorley should have placed his faith in the conservation of value in a personal God as does Varisco. Sorley "clings to the idea of a progressive increase of value in time", which endangers values because science teaches that time will at last wipe out all human achievements". Inge declared that if moral values are eternal, it is not in time, but in the unchanging mind of God. He thought that he discovered in Sorley a wavering between personal idealism and Platonism. He considered Sorley's "exclusive preoccupation with morality, which can hardly exist as such, in the eternal world,"¹ that which makes him so indifferent to the Platonic conception of value.

It may be that Sorley wavered between personal idealism and Platonism. He viewed the individual as the home of values, and he contended for the objectivity of values. But there was no denial of the presence of values in the Supreme Individual, and no denial of His eternity. Sorley does not view the finite individual as independent of the Infinite.² In this view, there seems then to be no

¹Inge, Rev. of MVIG, Mind, 28, 236-238.

²Thesis, 34.

1. Introduction

A. Definition of Knowledge

Among the very few critics of the work of

many of our best thinkers, there has been the view that

the idea of the individual as the possessor of

any special knowledge is false. It is the possession of

knowledge in a general sense, and not in a special

sense, that is the true basis of knowledge. This view

is not only true, but it is also the only view that

is true. It is the only view that is true, and it is

the only view that is true, and it is the only view

that is true. It is the only view that is true, and

it is the only view that is true, and it is the only

view that is true. It is the only view that is true,

and it is the only view that is true, and it is the

only view that is true. It is the only view that is

true.

It may be that knowledge is not a special

thing, but it is not a general thing either. It is

not a thing at all, but it is a thing in the

mind. It is a thing in the mind, and it is a thing

in the mind, and it is a thing in the mind, and it

is a thing in the mind, and it is a thing in the

mind. It is a thing in the mind, and it is a thing

in the mind, and it is a thing in the mind, and it

is a thing in the mind, and it is a thing in the

danger of the destruction of values when the temporal order is destroyed. And it is not necessary that morality "as such " continue to exist in the eternal world. It is doubtful whether anything in the temporal order will forever exist "as such".

Barker praised the second lecture of "Recent Tendencies in Ethics", by Sorley as the most masterly criticism of Evolutionist ethics that he knew.¹ Inge, in explaining the object of Sorley in writing his best book, referred to his doctrine of values as a "branch of philosophy which is more and more coming to hold a central position" in idealism.²

Sorley successfully defended his ethical foundation. The criticism of Bosanquet directed against the moralists who hold a narrow view of reality did not strike Sorley because he plead for complete experience and an interest in all values.³ Neither was Sorley a victim of the charge of holding the finite individual as an ultimate, and having, thus, nothing above it to inspire it on.⁴ For Sorley view^{ed} man not as ultimate value but rather as the bearer of values, the Ultimate being a transcendent God who urges man on to his best.

B. Criticism of Sorley's view of God.

Sabin, speaking for the empiricists, called the problems with which Sorley wrestled, the problem of the reconciliation of the moral and natural orders, and the problem of evil, "artificial" because they had their source,

¹Barker, Rev. of Sorley's RTE, Mind, 13, 418.

²Inge, Rev. of MVIG, Mind, 28, 234.

³Thesis, IX - X.

⁴Bosanquet, PIV, 25.

larger of the destruction of values when the temporal
order is destroyed. And it is not necessary that morality
"as such" continue to exist in the eternal world. It is
doubtful whether anything in the temporal order will ever
ever exist "as such".

But he praised the second feature of "German

Christianity in America," by Gortals the most masterly
criticism of evolutionary ethics that he knew. In fact, in
explaining the object of Gortals in writing his book, he
referred to his doctrine of values as a "crisis of ethics."
Only ethics is more and more coming to hold a central
position in American.

Gortals was, naturally, familiar with ethical theory.
The criticism of Kantianism directed against the
morality was not a narrow view of reality and not ethics.
Gortals was placed for his time as a critic of the
theory in all respects. He was not Gortals a victim of the
theory of morality. He was not Gortals an idealist, and
nevertheless, nothing more is to be known to us. For Gortals
also was not an idealist, but rather as the power of
values, the highest being a divinity, God who gives us
on his part.

3. Criticism of Gortals view of God.

Gortals, according to the author, called the
promises with which Gortals was faced, the problem of the
realization of the moral and natural order, and the
problem of evil, "artificial" because they are not natural.

Author, Rev. of Gortals, pp. 12, 13, 14.
Gortals, Rev. of Gortals, pp. 12, 13, 14.
Gortals, Rev. of Gortals, pp. 12, 13, 14.
Gortals, Rev. of Gortals, pp. 12, 13, 14.

she said, in "certain theistic assumptions".¹ But it is one who used the empirical method against whom this charge is made. And Sorley did not start with the assumption of God. He began with values, argued upon the basis of experience, and finally arrived at the conclusion that there must be a God to give unity to the universe. It was Sabin's failure to see this that caused her to censure the synoptic method used by Sorley to arrive at theism.¹

In this reasoning, Sorley avoided on the one hand pluralism, with its universe of independent persons and lack of unity, and on the other hand, monism with its semblance of unity at the expense of real personality.

It is interesting to note the relation of Sorley to a group of theists, Methodist theologians of the past and present. Sorley rejected the rationalistic argument offered by Kant and Schleiermacher as did Watson. Sorley did not use the intuitionist defense of theism which Raymond employed. Sorley approached the problem as did Curtis, in an empirical manner. Sorley stands over against Sheldon who made little use of the moral or evaluational argument. Sorley combined the theistic arguments even more than did Terry, who united the ontological with the cosmological and causal arguments. Sorley and Bowne, believing that Kant had well-nigh demolished the old theistic arguments, founded their theism on the belief in a cosmic universe and on a personal-world-ground.

C. Criticism of Sorley's attitude toward immortality.

While Bosanquet used "eternal" in an unnatural

¹Sabin, Rev. of MVIG, Jour.Phil., 16, 612-613.

way, Sorley used it in its most obvious meaning. Extension with the inspiring addition of eternal progress for the individual is much to be preferred to the conception of completeness in time merely, especially since the growth suggested in the term is not the growth of the individual but of the Absolute. Sorley did not "split" life up into a "present of endurance and a future of enjoyment".¹ Rather, life is a whole, bound together by value, purpose, and eternal progress. In such a theory there is no room for carelessness toward the present life. While the moral outlook upon the future life is not the only one (and Sorley recognized this), it gives a strong presumptive hope in immortality.

II. Bosanquet.

A. Criticism of Bosanquet's conception of man.

1. He was not above criticism upon the nature of the self.

Bosanquet was cognizant of the disagreement of Pringle-Pattison with him upon this subject.

He is resolute that a self must have freedom and a certain independent status. He is opposed to any hint of ultimate unreality in the self as we know it, to regarding it as a character rather than as a member of the universe, and to suggestions that its being is likely to be transitory. He feels, I think, that the value of soul-making is endangered if souls are continually to be remade.²

It is when Bosanquet placed himself in direct opposition to other philosophers that his impersonalism and

¹ Thesis, 54.

² Bosanquet, Rev. of "The Idea of God", by Pringle-Pattison, Mind, 26, 479.

...copy used is in the most obvious manner. In addition
with the increasing addition of external processes to the
individual is much to be explained to the satisfaction of
competence in this matter, especially since the growth
suggested in the text is not the growth of the individual
but of his knowledge. Every day we "live" life of mind
"processes of knowledge and a theory of knowledge". However,
life is a whole, bound together by values, purposes, and
external processes. In such a theory there is no room for
external processes. Indeed the present life. While the mind
look upon the future life in the very same way, and
responsibility, it gives a strong suggestive force to
individuality.

11. Conclusion.
A. Criticism of Rosenzweig's conception of the
... is a more critical view of the nature
of his work.
Rosenzweig was cognizant of the disintegration of
... with his own work.

He is convinced that a self must have
... in a certain independent manner.
He is opposed to any kind of external
... in the world as we know it, to the
... it as a separate entity, and to the
... of the universe, and to the
... that the being is likely to be external.
He feels, I think, that the value of a self
... is something it acquires and develops
to be possible.

It is when Rosenzweig himself is faced
... that his independence and

its implications are clearly seen. It is the view of this thesis that an individual "must have freedom and a certain independent status", that he is "a member of the universe", that he is not "transitory", and that there is a danger in souls' continually being remade, if in each creative or self-transcendent stage, they become less and less personal until their personality is finally swallowed up in some abstract, indefinable, impersonal something.

Various writers have expressed their opposition to Bosanquet upon his conception of the self, Pringle-Pattison, Merrington, Leighton, Oakeley, and Stedman among others. Pringle-Pattison objected to the whole idea of the overlapping of selves.¹ Merrington asserted that the self is real, "our bed-rock of fact", the place where we touch reality.² He declared that religion, morality, experience and a true metaphysic of knowledge demand a private center of experience.³ To Leighton, the metaphysics of value and selfhood presented by Bosanquet was unsatisfactory because it made no more of the whole as "a spiritual community", and because it made the principle of totality absorb persons into an impersonal whole.⁴ Oakeley repudiates this impersonalism because in monism neither the part nor the whole is personal, because the Neo-Hegelians, viewing the whole as real are forced to surrender personality, and because this conception represented by Bosanquet must "render unintelligible the profound experience of personality feeling itself to be in contact with reality."⁵

¹Pringle-Pattison, "The Idea of God": A Reply., Mind, 28, 12-13

²Merrington, PP, Rev. of Pattison's "Hegelianism and Personality", 132. ³Ibid. ⁴Leighton, "An Estimate of Bosanquet's Philosophy", Phil. Rev., 32, 630-631.

⁵Oakeley, Hilda D. "Personality", EB, XVII, 614.

Stedman has penetrated to the heart of the doctrine of self-transcendence.¹ The root verb "to transcend" means "to be more than", "to surpass". When this becomes reflexive, what becomes of the self that surpasses itself, he asks. He answers that in the scheme of Bosanquet there is no self to begin with, no self-identity. This of course, does away with the doctrine of self-transcendence, for there is no self to be transcended. Thus the transcendence is only of motions, tensions, expansions and contractions within the whole. There is no self, only tendencies or "claims" to selfhood. So self-transcendence is not what it at first appears to be, "a profitable episode in the history of a self." Monism both demanded and destroyed this doctrine. Stedman discovers no place for individual growth in this system. The benefits of transcendence all go to the Absolute, and for a sufficient reason: Bosanquet could not credit the individual with his own growth without departing from monism.

2. He was not clear and consistent on freedom and the dangers of life.

Sorley gave a reasonable account of the dangers to which man is exposed. But Bosanquet with no real self, no real center of experience and volition, could not write clearly and consistently of freedom. Sorley appears to be correct; there is no place for real freedom and purpose in monism. Bosanquet, speaking of existence in a world of claims and counter-claims, the individual "burdened" by the sense of duty to a superior being, said that the self makes a

¹ Stedman, "An Examination of Bosanquet's Doctrine of Self-Transcendence", Mind, Apr. 162-163, July 289-302; 307-308.

"number of demands upon the superior being and upon other". Out of this, somehow, Bosanquet derived the idea that life is inherently and essentially one of hazard and hardship.¹

It is bound to the hazard of attempting to live by the command of a superior, which is outside and above it, an attempt which in the nature of the case must prove a continual failure.... It is bound to the hardship of constantly making demands for respect and assistance from God, nature and our fellow-man.²

Had Bosanquet been in possession of the religious consciousness,^{*} the outlook and the "uplook" of the Apostle Paul,³ regarding God as a personal Being, A Father who is desirous of helping His children, and able to do so through His Spirit who dwells in His children, the hazard would have disappeared, and it would not be considered a hardship to ask for the supply of needs. Conscious of the indwelling Christ, and in a spirit of optimism and power, Paul cried, "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me.". The great hardships and hazards are not those inherent in the finite condition of man but in his sinful condition. This fact and the belief of thousands of people outside of the Christian faith, even, in an immanent God either in connection with, or separate from, belief in a transcendent God Bosanquet ignored.

¹Bosanquet, VDI, 131;

²Ibid, 132.

³Philippians 2: 12-13.

^{*} Consciousness, not experience, for Bosanquet had a religious experience, and could not have had Paul's experience.

"number of persons upon the subject being and upon other".
Out of this, however, Rosenstock derived the idea that life
is inherently and essentially an all-around and pervasive

It is found in the history of
religion to live by the command of a
superior, which is outside and above it,
an external basis in the nature of the
case must have a substantial reality....
It is found in the history of religion
that persons for reasons and purposes
from God, nature and the fellow-man.

Had Rosenstock been in possession of the
religious consciousness, "the religious and religious" of the
Apostle Paul, the religious God as a personal being, a Father
who is conscious of helping His children, and who is so
through His Spirit who dwells in His children, the person
would have disappeared, and he would have been considered a
personality to see for the supply of needs. The person of the
individual Christ, and in a spirit of optimism and power.
Paul cried, "I can do all things through Christ who strengthens
me." The great religious and human etc. and these
imposed in the little condition of man and in his ability
condition. This fact and the belief of persons of people
society of the Christian faith, even, in an inward God
either in connection with, or separate from, belief in a
transcendent God becomes ignored.

1. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952.
2. Ibid., 1952.
3. Ibid., 1952, 1953.
4. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.
5. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.
6. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.
7. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.
8. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.
9. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.
10. Rosenstock, 1951, 1952, 1953.

B. Criticism of Bosanquet's view of God.

1. Bosanquet was inconsistent in his opposition to theism.

He praised Hegel for his conception of the incarnation, and yet he did not carry that conception to its logical end. It was concerning the work of Hegel that he uttered the following:

Nor has philosophic insight ever done better service to this history of religion than in grasping the essence of Christianity as a unity (not merely the union) or the divine and human nature.

Hegel had seen the necessity of the incarnation of deity in human form. Now if deity is not personal, the doctrine is without significance. Bosanquet knew that in Hegel's thought, "God necessarily reveals Himself as a Trinity of Persons".² Hegel had declared that "the highest view of God is in terms of Personality or Mind."³ The praise of Bosanquet here is empty, if the incarnation is robbed of its personal content.

Bosanquet was inconsistent in some respects also with his own position when he opposed theism. It would appear that if he had consistently carried out his conception of the principle of Individuality as the clue to reality that he would have arrived at the idea of the personality of the Infinite. He urged that we seek the Infinite in the finite, and the perfect in the imperfect.

¹Bosanquet, PFA, XXIV;

²Ibid. XXX-XXXII.

³Hegel, Encycl of Phil. Science. 204.

2. Criticism of Hegel's view of God.
1. Hegel was inconsistent in his
opposition to dualism.

He treated Hegel on the occasion of the
discussion, and yet he did not carry out his opposition to the
logical end. It was contradictory: the logic of Hegel that he
described the following:

But his religious idealism was
based upon a false notion of
religion. It was a false notion of
Christianity as a unit, and it was the
entirely false notion of religion.

Hegel had seen the necessity of the
of duty in human life. Now it seems to be
duty is without significance. Hegel was
Hegel's concept of God was not a religious
of Hegel. Hegel had declared that "the highest will of
God is in view of personality or will." The will of
Hegel was not a duty, it was a declaration of the
person's content.

Hegel was inconsistent in his necessity
to with his own position when he declared that. It would
seem that if he had consistently carried out his conception
of the principle of individuality as the only reality that
he would have arrived at the idea of the personality of the
individual. He urged that we seek the infinite in the finite,
and the perfect in the imperfect.

Hegel, *Enquiry of Will, Science, 204.*
Hegel, *Enquiry of Will, Science, 204.*
Hegel, *Enquiry of Will, Science, 204.*

The Absolute or infinite should present itself to us as more of the finite, or the finite at its best and not at its extinction.¹

To be more than a person, the Absolute can not be less than a person. The individual is not "at its best" when he is unconscious. Yet Bosanquet has not presented the Absolute to us as more than the finite or the finite at its best, but rather at its extinction in the impersonal whole. It is true that self-transcendence is not a process of self-extinction, but this is because there is no real self to become extinct.²

In general, Bosanquet treated God as impersonal, and yet this was not maintained consistently, for in a work published after his death, he asked, "What have we men to do with God's will?" He divided the question into two parts: How are we to know what is God's will? and why should we do God's will? But why talk of God's will if God is not a person? Will is a mode of personality. Does this indicate that Bosanquet changed his mind just before he died?

In this connection, his inconsistency is revealed in the charge of anthropomorphism which he laid at the door of theism. It should be said first that this did not touch Sorley, for he has said:

¹PIV, 255;

²Thesis.

³Bosanquet, SP, 339.

The Absolute or Infinite should
be regarded as an idea of the finite,
or the finite as the cause and not as the
effect.

It is more than a person, the Absolute can
not be less than a person. The individual is not the cause
when he is unconscious. Yet consciousness has not preceded the
Absolute for he is more than the finite or the finite as he
is, but rather as the extinction in the individual world.
It is true that self-consciousness is not a process of self-
extinction, but this is because there is no self to be
extinct.

In general, however, treated not as in-
personal, and yet this was not understood completely, for
in a work published after his death, he asked, "What have we
now to do with God's will?" He divided the question into two
parts: How can we know what is God's will? and why should
we do God's will? But why call it God's will if God is not a
person? Will is a mode of consciousness. Does this indicate
that consciousness changed his mind before he died?
In this connection, his consciousness is
revealed in the range of self-consciousness which he laid at
the door of death. It should be said that this was
not death itself, for he has said:

1894, 230.
1895, 231.
1896, 232.

We have not been arguing that God is good because we find goodness in man, but that he is good because we find the idea of goodness to be valid for that universal order which we are trying to understand.¹

But while the personalist Sorley turns to the universal order for the clue to reality or the nature of deity, the impersonalist Bosanquet, strangely turns to man, the individual at his best and not at his extinction, which, of course, must imply personality, for his explanation of the Infinite, laying himself open to his own charge of anthropomorphism.

Then, Bosanquet was not consistent upon the subject of prayer, in its relation to theism. He put forward a definition, it is true, that does not necessitate a personal God, "Meditation".² In the same connection, he discarded the personal terms, 'Father', 'King', 'Lord', and 'Creator'. But at the head of the chapter he put a part of the Christian's prayer to his heavenly Father: "After this manner therefore pray ye.. Thy will be done". Now in view of Bosanquet's suggestion that prayer is meditation, we ask Does the Christian pray to himself? Or does he pray to humanity, which according to Bosanquet is more or less immanent in him? Is the Christian praying for his own will to be done?³ It would seem that Bosanquet did not mean that the Christian is meditating upon, or worshipping, himself, for he taught that the religious man trusts in no strength of his own.³ Then he must mean humanity, and nature conceived as an impersonal organism. Still prayer as meditation upon an impersonal organism, is a conception too

¹ Sorley, MVIG, 496;
² Bosanquet, WRI, 67;

³ Thesis, 13.

We have not seen anyone else
in good because he had no money in hand,
but that he is good because he has the
idea of goodness to be well for that.
universal, which we are trying to
understand.

And while the universalist theory tends to
the universal order for the sake of unity or the nature
of deity, the particularist viewpoint, especially when it
has, the individual as his best and not as his extension,
which, of course, must imply particularity, for his extension
of the individual, leaving himself open to the own sense of
anthropocentrism.

Then, Rosenbaum was not content with the
subject of prayer, he is related to action. He was toward
a definition, it is true, that does not necessitate a personal
God, "Meditation".² In the same connection, he discussed the
personal terms, 'I', 'thou', 'me', 'you', 'us', 'them', 'we', 'they',
the head of the church for a part of the Christian world
to his heavenly Father. After this manner, the whole prayer is
"I will be done". Now in view of Rosenbaum's suggestion
that prayer is meditation, we can hear the Christian pray to
himself. Or does he pray to himself, which according to
Rosenbaum is more or less inherent in him? Is the Christian
praying for his own will or for others? It would seem that
Rosenbaum did not mean that the Christian is meditating upon
or worshipping himself, for he taught that the religious man
lives in the service of the Lord.³ Then he must mean himself,
and prayer conceived as an individual organism. Still prayer
as meditation upon an impersonal organism, is a conception for

² Ibid., 12.

³ Rosenbaum, W. L., 1938:
Ibid., 12, 13.

foreign to the nature of Christian prayer to be illustrated by the form, "Our Father which art in Heaven-", which fears the idea of a transcendent as well as personal God, both of which conceptions Bosanquet rejected.

Here another inconsistency comes to the surface, the denial of a transcendent God.¹ But Bosanquet's main doctrine, self-transcendence is meaningless if the Absolute is not transcendent as well as immanent. The Absolute must be above the person in order for the person to rise to it. Merrington has demonstrated the hopelessness of holding a doctrine of immanence without counterbalancing it with the harmonizing principle of transcendence.²

Bosanquet was not consistent in his doctrine of monism because he had no transcendent, personal God. Sorley showed that either the moral order or the natural order must be sacrificed in monism.³ Like Kant, he had a ground on which these diverse orders could come together, a personal, transcendent God. Bosanquet with no such uniting agency failed to bring the unity to the universe, though he attempted to do it in his doctrine of self-transcendence.³ He strove in vain to show that the causal forces of nature are related to the moral purposes of mankind apart from any external Divine Intellect.⁴ He wavered upon the matter as can be seen in the following statement:

¹Thesis, 29 with SP, 337;

²Merrington, PR, 214;

³Thesis, 24;

⁴Bosanquet, SP, 123-124, 129.

That while it appears to me that nothing is gained for the interpretation of the world by the assumption of a divine intellect underlying it, it also appears that...nothing is determined in the interpretation of the world by surrendering this assumption.¹

2. Bosanquet was unfair in his attack upon theism.

One should be fair in making a charge of unfairness against another; thus, let it be noted that Bosanquet was in the main fair in his treatment of other systems. This is revealed in his work, "The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophical Thought".² It is true that he may not have understood clearly the teachings of theism, but one, in order to be fair in criticism should understand.

For this reason, Bosanquet was unfair in his attack upon theism when he misused the terms of the Christian Revelation, which represents a part of theism. He confused the words, "make" with "mould", and "salvation" with "creation" and "shaping". Asking, "How are Souls made?", he answered, "By a grander system of Salvation than the Christian Religion".³ Creation and salvation are not the same. Then in the illustration of the school/^{which} follows, he makes no distinction between, "make" or "create" and "mould". He said that this "Spirit Creation" is affected by "three grand materials" acting upon one another for a series of years; intellect, the human heart, and the world. But Plato pointed out that only the soul is self-moving.⁴ Without a soul or person either in or behind these materials, Bosanquet has no source of action. This will be more clear if we consider the illustration. This school, he

¹ Bosanquet, SP, 123;
² Hornle, in Memoriam.
Jour. Phil., 20.

³ Bosanquet, VDI, 65;
⁴ Plato, Phaedrus, 245c, & Hastings,
ERE, XI, 741.

That while it is a matter of no small importance to the student of the history of the world to know the names of the great men who have lived, it is equally important to know the names of the great men who have died. The names of the great men who have lived are well known to all, but the names of the great men who have died are not so well known. It is therefore, a matter of no small importance to the student of the history of the world to know the names of the great men who have died.

2. The names of the great men who have died.

These names.

One should be able to name a number of the

names of the great men who have died. It is not enough to know the names of the great men who have lived, but one should also know the names of the great men who have died. This is because the names of the great men who have died are often the names of the great men who have lived. It is therefore, a matter of no small importance to the student of the history of the world to know the names of the great men who have died.

For this reason, the names of the great men who have died

are often the names of the great men who have lived. It is not enough to know the names of the great men who have lived, but one should also know the names of the great men who have died. This is because the names of the great men who have died are often the names of the great men who have lived. It is therefore, a matter of no small importance to the student of the history of the world to know the names of the great men who have died.

"The names of the great men who have died." It is not enough to know the names of the great men who have lived, but one should also know the names of the great men who have died.

Creation is affected by "the great men who have died." It is not enough to know the names of the great men who have lived, but one should also know the names of the great men who have died. This is because the names of the great men who have died are often the names of the great men who have lived. It is therefore, a matter of no small importance to the student of the history of the world to know the names of the great men who have died.

said, is instituted for the purpose of teaching little children to read.

I will call the human heart the horn book read in that school, and I will call the child able to read, the soul made from that school and its horn book. Do you not see how necessary a world of pains and troubles is to school an intellect, and make it a soul?...Not - merely is the Heart a horn book, it is the mind's Bible, it is the mind's experience, it is the text from which the Mind or Intellect sucks its identity. As various as the lives of men are, so various become their Souls, and thus God makes individual beings, Souls, identical Souls of the sparks of his own essence.¹

This, Bosanquet considered a "faint" sketch of a system of salvation which will not offend reason. It is indeed "faint", In the first place, there is no "salvation", here in the Christian sense of the term. In the second place an illustration should illustrate; there should be consistency among the elements; and none of these should be ignored, at least no essential element. For instance, a teacher is a necessary factor in an analogy drawn from a school. In the figure above we have the child(soul), the book(heart), and the school (world), but where is the teacher? Not God, for he is represented here as the maker of the child(soul). Who "instituted" the school? No answer. He said that the school was instituted for a purpose. But only a person can institute anything, and have purpose. Yet, strangely, Bosanquet has no personal God. So he has no original creator, institutor, or instructor. A child may "suck" knowledge from a book, but not "identity" or personality. "Grand" indeed is the work of

¹Bosanquet, VDI, 65-66.

impersonal intellect, heart and world, that can give personality to souls."Grand" indeed is the work of a school that without a personal institutor and a personal tutor, can impart personal identity to students who have no personal Creator. What is the original source of personality? Bosanquet had no answer. Yet he saw no mystery or difficulty in the origin of personal life.

Once granting that an omnipotential principle, the active form of totality, can attach itself in an unconscious or a conscious state to certain arrangements of matter, the problem of soul-making, which in our ignorance, we must accept as stretching downwards to the beginning of life, offers no difficulty nor myster.¹

Once granted that an impersonal principle can attach itself to matter and without any source of personality, the mystery is cleared up. But the difficulty is in, granting that. Bosanquet will have to have more than an omnipotential principle in order to get consciousness into unconsciousness matter. He will have to have more than ^{an} abstract impersonal principle for it to decide (an alternative in this, calling for a choice) whether it will make matter conscious or unconscious. High sounding and abstract words in illustrations that do not illustrate can never cover up the lack in an impersonal system, nor give substance to an attack upon the consistent Christian conception of a personal God as the First Cause, the final explanation of all things and persons.

The unfairness of Bosanquet is his attitude toward theism is seen also in his charge that it is guilty of

¹ Bosanquet, VDI, 78.

...the origin of personal life.

Once established that a personal...
...the origin of personal life.

...the origin of personal life.

evasion when it says that God actuates or produces the free as free, and that God is only a true Creator if he creates creators. For not only did Bosanquet misuse the terms "create" and "mould", but he mistook "literal" (in the expression, "God a literal Creator") for "Absolute" or "Final", and "detail" for "full content". If theism asserts that God is the only moulding influence on the soul, or that He gives it its full content at creation or birth, then Bosanquet was right, but only then. He said, "To will a will is to will its detail". Now, it is true that in order to will a will that God must have its essential nature in mind. But it is not true that he must think, much less determine, its final and complete content, in so doing. If it be true, for instance, that God made man's will after the pattern of His own divine will, (as at least some theists assert) then He willed to man the power to choose freely. This constitutes the essential nature of man's will; no more is needed, and anything more would make it unlike God's will, for anything more would determine the will of man. Theism asserts no more on this point than free will. Nor does a theist necessarily interpret his consciousness of the universe as "a consciousness of independent beings"², for finite beings may have free will plus a sense of dependence; in fact to be finite, (and religious) implies that. Bowne, a theist, said, that persons are relatively independent of the Divine Person".³ Thus a fair view of theism would not consider it guilty of evasion.

¹Bosanquet, VDI, 136;

²Ibid. 136-137;

³Bowne, M. 102.

even though it says that God is not a person, the text
 as true, and that God is only a name. If he is not
 creature, how can only his personhood make the name "creature"
 and "being", and be without "being"? In the expression,
 "God is a person (creature)" for "being" or "person", and "being"
 for "being" or "person". It is not possible that God is not
 something different as the soul, or that he is in the soul
 without an operation or will. This statement was right, but
 only God. He will, "He will a will to be with the world".
 For, it is true that in order to will a will, God must have
 the essential nature in mind. But it is not true that he must
 think, even less determine, the time and content of his will
 in doing. It is the fact, for instance, that God wills a will
 after the nature of his own divine will, but it is not true
 that he wills a will to be with the world to make the world
 This constitutes the essential nature of man's will; in order
 to be made, and anything more would make it divine God's will.
 For anything more would determine the will of man, and thus
 make it no more on this point than man's will. But God is
 the one necessarily independent in his consciousness of the universe
 as "a consciousness of independent being". For this being
 may have been with him a sense of dependence; in fact to be
 that, (and religiously) it is. Being, a being, and
 that person are relatively independent of the divine person.
 Thus a will of man would not constitute a will of God.

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C. Criticism of Bosanquet's conception of the future life.

1. He did not take the principle of the stability and safety of souls to its logical conclusion.

It is strange that Bosanquet did not carry farther his principle of the stability and safety of souls, and make them really stable and eternally safe. To be consistent, he should have done this. For he called the intelligences, or sparks of the divine that are not souls until they acquire an identity, "God".¹ God, as he used the term here, is divine. So that unless Bosanquet insisted (which he did not) that the intelligence changes its nature when it becomes a soul, it is divine, and therefore, as Plato urged, immortal. Bosanquet affirmed as part of his main thesis that the individual is always in the Absolute.² But this Absolute is the totality of experience.³ What is experience, however, if it is not conscious?

2. He did not go where he usually went for the answer to problems.

It is strange also, that Bosanquet did not find an answer to the question of a future conscious existence in the field to which otherwise he constantly appealed-- religion. We may ignore the fact that he found no answer in the realms of philosophy and ethics, where Sorley seemed to find a satisfactory solution of the problem. But why did not Bosanquet declare what has been a characteristic conviction of the religious consciousness practically throughout its

¹Bosanquet, VDI;
²Ibid. 68, footnote;
³Thesis, 42.

U. Christian of Boston at a conference of

the Boston Div.

1. He did not take the principle of the

essentially and matter of unity in the highest

association.

It is strange that Housman did not carry

further the principle of the stability and safety of society,

and make them really stable and eternally safe. To be con-

sistent, he should have done this. For he called the social

system, on account of the division and not unity, a

system of identity, not of unity, as he used the term, in

divine. So that unless Housman insisted (which he did not)

that the intelligence changes for nature and is

soul, it is divine, and therefore, as Housman argued, immortal.

Housman affirmed as part of his main thesis that the social

ideal is always in the process of becoming, but this is not

really of experience. What is experience, however, it is

not conscious?

2. He did not go where he usually went for

the answer to problems.

It is strange also, that Housman did not

find an answer to the question of a future conscious

ness in the field to which otherwise he consistently resorted.

religion. We say "there" the fact that he found no answer in

the realm of philosophy and ethics, where Bailey seemed to

find a satisfactory solution of the problem. But why did not

Housman believe that there was a characteristic connection

of the religious consciousness practically throughout the

Housman, Vol. 1
Field, 1871
Theist, 1871

history in all time and in all lands? Why did he not trust upon this point the testimony of the experience of the religious man which he called "the clue to reality"?¹ He was not true to religious experience and the religious consciousness when he denied that the question of survival of beings has any special interest to religion.² He acknowledged, as has been shown that it is natural to believe in extension of life, that it is wide spread among the nations, and that in the form of meliorism it is in many present day philosophies.³ He did not dare to say that the student or statesman, who desired continuation of life in order to complete his work, was wrong.⁴ Yet he thought that the vast masses had other ideas. This may be true concerning the motive of desire for future existence, but not of the desire itself.

3. He argued on the basis of an unnatural desire.

And it is upon the basis of desire that B Bosanquet argued. He asked, "What destiny can we consistently desire?", and answers, "No one will much object to an identification of the self in the main with the things we mainly care for".⁵ Since the matter is placed upon this basis of personal desire, let it be said that it is an unnatural desire that prompts the acceptance of any immortality of principles as a substitute for hope in a conscious future existence. Men for the most part, at least, want life, eternal life, even though it be no better than the life which they now enjoy. To be as good as this life it must be conscious. Millions have lived and died with that desire. No one wants to say an

¹ Thesis 14.

² Thesis, 47, 13:

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. and SSE, 84;

⁵ Bosanquet, VDI, 260.

blatantly in all times and in all lands. Why did he not express
upon this point the feeling of the thousands of the world
who can only be called "the other"? He was not
true to his own experience and the religious consciousness
which he shared with the question of survival of the fittest and
the spiritual interest in religion. He acknowledged, as we have seen
that it is natural to believe in extension of life, that it
is also natural to believe in the future, and that in the future
religion is to be in many respects a philosophy. It is not
this to say that the student or student, who studies con-
ditions of life in order to improve his work, can avoid
the conclusion that the vast masses had other things. This was
the first consideration the motive of desire for future existence.
But not of the desire itself.

3. He argued on the basis of an unattainable
desire.

And it is upon the basis of desire that a
Buddhist argued. He asked, "What desire can we realistically
desire?" and answers, "No one will wish to be an im-
mortal of the self in the world with the things we really
want." Since the matter is placed upon this basis of
personal desire, let it be said that it is an unattainable desire
that motivates the acceptance of any form of religion
as a substitute for hope in a continuous future existence.
Now for the most part, at least, what life, eternal life, even
though it be no better than the life which we now enjoy.
To be as good as this life is what he considered. With this
have lived and died with that desire. No one wants to say so
1. The desire for
2. The desire for
3. The desire for

eternal "good-by to his loved ones. Barbellion,¹ constantly disappointed in life, and dying early in life, triumphed in death, rising to a sublime hope in immortality; he believed that such love as he bore his wife would never die. Furthermore, Sorley seems reasonable in saying that the principles which men desire to see perpetuated are such as can be perpetuated only by persons.² If perpetuated eternally, they must be perpetuated by eternal persons. One would rather look after his own interests. After all the problem of personal immortality is a personal problem. Bosanquet recognized this when he put the matter upon the basis of personal desire.

¹ Barbellion, JDM;

² Thesis. 46-47

eternal "good-by" to his loved ones. "Surrendering" to
disappointed in life, and dying early in life, he
death, rising to a higher plane in immortality; he
that even love as he felt his wife would never die. "Surrendering"
was, Henry never responsible to saying that the relationship
which was given to me was not a relationship, but a
relationship of person. "If I had not been eternally, they would be
perpetrated by eternal persons. One would rather look at
his own interest. After all the people at present (human)
it is a personal matter. No one can recognize this when he
has the matter upon the basis of personal desire.

1-Perception, 2nd;
2-Perception, 1st

SUMMARY

Thus it has been seen that Bosanquet and Sorley regarded man as an intellectual, social, moral, and religious being, that neither emphasized the intellectual aspect, and that Bosanquet laid the stress upon the social and religious aspects while Sorley dwelt largely upon the moral nature of man. Bosanquet saw in man thus, a finite-infinite creature who revealed his true individuality in association both with his fellow-men and the Absolute. Sorley, on the other hand, saw true individuality in the exercise by man of thoice, especially of the values of life, and held that the individual should be evaluated in the light also of unrealized values and his uniqueness.

Both Bosanquet and Sorley looked upon man as a free being; both rejected trivial choices as a test of freedom, Bosanquet placing freedom in the great logical choices, and in the contact of man with the whole; Sorley placing freedom in the moral choices, and in man's relation to values, the choice of which was in God's mind for man when he made him a free being. It was Sorley who seemed to grasp most clearly the importance of freedom, viewing it in the light of the unity of reality, and value. Both writers saw that freedom carried with it a danger; Bosanquet seeing its source in the finite condition of man and in the pleasures and pains of life, Sorley sensing danger in the abuse of freedom and in possible final failure to fulfil the purposes of God. Both saw that freedom in man

is limited; Bosanquet limiting man in his relation to the Absolute, while Sorley placed the limitation in man's relation to nature and to God. Both writers recognized that determinism, materialism and naturalism have no place for the freedom of man. But Sorley goes beyond and declares that the theories of monism and the "strongest motive" destroy human freedom. For Bosanquet, freedom lay in the spiritual, supersensuous world, while for Sorley it lies in the self and time.

Both Bosanquet and Sorley believed that reality can be known. The former rejecting the interpretations of materialism, pluralism and theism, denied that time, the self (per se) and the divine Self are real, and declared that the Absolute is real, other things and persons having reality only to the extent of their absorption in this whole. Sorley rejecting materialism, anti-theistic pluralism and monism, discovers reality in existents, that is, persons (including the supreme Person), things and organic life, in relations and in values, but making the qualification that persons alone have intrinsic value. The diverse views of our two writers are seen upon the subject of the relation of persons to reality. Bosanquet looked at the problem from the standpoint of the Absolute; Sorley from the standpoint of the individual.

In regard to the goal of the individual, life or adaptation to environment, or self-preservation, was not considered by Bosanquet, and was definitely rejected by Sorley. Both think happiness is an unworthy goal. Bosanquet puts forward, instead, absorption

into the Absolute, while Sorley suggests goodness as the true ideal. Each man refuses to accept the contribution that the other makes in the matter.

Bosanquet found no solution of the problem of immortality in the fields of ethics, philosophy and religion. Hence, though he talked of eternal life, it was not in the sense of prolongation of life, not conscious future existence of the person, involving, as he thought the conception of a compensation awaiting man in the future, but rather in the sense of completeness of life in the present, the prolongation of the influence and the values of the individual in the life of the race. But, strangely, he described this complete life in the present as eternal progress, seemingly making a distinction that denoted no difference, admitting progress "unending" but not progress "ad infinitum." What Bosanquet rejected, Sorley held, with the possible exception of compensation which he did not discuss.

Finally, while Sorley offered a logical picture of God and man, Bosanquet in his impersonalism was led to unfortunate views of the nature of God and of the nature and destiny of man. Throughout the comparison, Sorley has presented the more reasonable, adequate and satisfactory account of personality.

into the spiritual, while denying a separate position as the
true ideal. Thus the refusal to accept the spiritual
that the other takes in the matter.

Throughout the history of the problem
of immortality in the field of ethics, philosophy and
religion. Hence, though we speak of eternal life, it is
not in the sense of prolongation of life, but as a
future existence of the person, involving, as we thought,
the acquisition of a new position relative to the future.
But rather in the sense of a complete change of life in the over-
all, the prolongation of the influence and the value of the
individual in the life of the world. But, nevertheless, immor-
tality and eternal life in the present as a moral progress,
morally being a condition that cannot be different.
"eternal progress" meaning "not progress" as immortality.
That immortality is not, but it is held, with the possibility
of immortality in which we live and act.

Finally, while denying a logical position
of the soul, as proposed in his immortality, we are not to
ignore the value of the nature of God and of the nature of
the soul. Throughout the history, history has
presented the same questions, questions and answers
about the immortality.

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